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REPORT TO GOVERNOR JOHN A. LOVE ON
CERTAIN COLORADO WATER LAW PROBLEMS'
By

JOHN UNDEM CARLSON**

In a semi-arid state like Colorado, the importance of water
and the uses to which it is put loom large. As this resource
approaches full utilization, concern that social and environmental values be protected becomes paramount. The resolution
of these concerns is complicated by a system of water law
rooted in the state constitution. The potentialities for and the
difficulties of solution of the resource management problem
within Colorado's water law system are highlighted in this
article which should provide an impetus toward solution of
the problems surrounding this most necessary and somewhat
unpredictable resource. Originally a report prepared for Governor John A. Love, this article examines the water law of
Colorado as it presently exists, and analyzes this body of law in
relation to the state's interest in social and environmental uses.
The footnote format has been changed to conform to the Uniform System of Citation, and there have been minor organizational changes in order to conform to Law Journal format;
otherwise, the text as within sections is substantially as it appears in the original report.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE doctrine of prior appropriation was law in Colorado
before statehood and adoption of the constitution in 1876,1
which, in article XVI, sections 5 and 6, recognized and confirmed prior appropriation as the fundamental water law of the
state. 2 The origin of this system of water law lies in the obvious
scarcity of water in the arid West, the belief that natural resources (water, land, minerals) should be placed in private hands
to foster growth and development, and the desire to allocate the
scarce resources among the builders of the state with sufficient
definiteness so that economic investments would be based on a
stable footing. The allocation of water in an appropriation doctrine state rests on the fundamental notion of "first in time, first
in right"; that is to say, the first person to use water acquires
the right to its future use as against later users.
This kind of allocation of resources is not peculiar to water;
in the 19th century the public domain of the United States
was opened to the populace on very much the same basis. The
first person to locate a mining claim could, by performance
of certain acts of development of the mineral resources, obtain
good title to the claim. 3 The first settler to locate on a home* This article is based on a report prepared for Governor John A. Love by

the firm of Holland & Hart. It is printed here with permission of the

Governor.
Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1962, University of
Montana; B.A., 1964, Oxford University; LL.B., 1967, Yale University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of James E.
Hegarty, Frank H. Morison, Jack L. Smith, and Jeanette P. Meier in
the preparation of this article.
1 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

** Partner,

2

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5-7 provide:
Section 5. Water of streams public property. The water
of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within
the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
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stead site could, by performance of certain acts of development of the virgin prairie, obtain good title to the lands.4 The
settlement and development of the West were promoted by
these policies.
In the early development of prior appropriation law, it was
clear that a judicial decree did not create the water right; the
right was created by diversion of water and application to
beneficial use. The judicial decree was merely evidence of its
place within the priority system. Failure to participate in
adjudication proceedings rendered the right junior to those who
sought decrees. 5 This recording system for priorities has been
held not to affect those water rights perfected prior to the
adoption of statutory adjudication procedure.6
Determinations of water rights in Colorado were purely
judicial matters until the passage of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (hereafter referred to
as the "1969 Act") .7 The 1969 Act added some element of an
administrative law approach to determinations of water rights,
in that most water matters may now be heard initially by
"referees." It remains true, however, that Colorado continues to
employ a judicially oriented and judicially derived water law
rather than an administrative water law. In this respect Colorado has rejected the administrative permit system long ago
the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
Section 6. Diverting unappropriatedwater -priority preferred uses. The right to divert the unappropriated waters of
any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service
of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those
claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using
the same for manufacturing purposes.
Section 7. Right-of-way for ditches, flumes. All persons
and corporations shall have the right-of-way across public,
private and corporate lands for the construction of ditches,
canals and flumes for the purpose of conveying water for
domestic purposes, for the irrigation cf agricultural lands, and
for mining and manufacturing purposes, and for drainage,
upon payment of just compensation.
3 30 U.S.C. §§ 22 et seq. (1970).
4 Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39; Homestead Act, ch. 75,

12 Stat. 392.

Hardesty Reservoir, Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet &
Irrigated Land Co., 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929). This result was
codified in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-22 (Supp. 1971).
6 Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co. v. Fort Collins Milling & Elevator Co., 60
Colo. 241, 152 P. 1160 (1915).
7 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969, as amended, Supp.
5

1971).
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adopted in the other appropriation states.
Colorado is fast reaching the point where there is little
"unappropriated" water left. The lawful demands of all decreed
rights plus the demands of conditionally decreed rights and
applications for conditional rights may be sufficent to consume
the available water in the stateft If this assumption about available water is correct, the legal procedures by which a new water
right is created are less significant for the future of Colorado
than are the legal procedures by which existing water rights are
changed or transferred, and by which existing conditional decrees are made absolute.
As a general principle, the owner of a water right is free
to change the place or nature of use thereof, subject only to the
condition that the change will not "injuriously affect the owner
of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right
or a decreed conditional water right."9 We foresee an increasing volume of change of water right applications, for the economic value of a good water supply for municipal, industrial,
or real estate development purposes is greater, in purely dollar
terms, than the value of decreed water in the hands of irrigators, mutual ditch companies, and the like.
The Review Draft of the National Water Commission 0
adopts the thesis advanced by Dean Frank Treleasell and Professor Charles Meyers 1 2 that the legal system should freely
expedite market transfers of water rights, including transfers
from irrigation uses to municipal uses. Dean Trelease and Professor Meyers subscribe to the view that economic forces work
wisely in taking lands from agricultural production and applying water gained thereby to "higher uses" such as providing
municipal supplies. This belief that the market place makes
the best choice is illustrated by Dean Trelease's view that:
Economic efficiency requires that water be transferred from
less productive users to more productive users, from less valuable uses to mcre valuable uses .... Where property rights in a
resource are recognized, and sales of such rights by their owners
are permitted, the market (or price) system will automatically
13
allocate a resource to its highest-valued use.
8 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613,

petition for rehearing denied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(3)

(Supp. 1969).

7-76 to -98 (Review Draft, Nov. 1972) [hereinafter cited as NWC].
11 Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case
Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1966).
12 C. MEYERS, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS (National Water Commission Legal Study, 1972).
10 PROPOSED REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION
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Meyers (and to an important extent the Review Draft of
the National Water Commission adopts a similar position) feels
that to resort to non-market criteria in allocating water
resources by restraining transfers is unwise:
Two criticisms [of non-market allocations] are fundamental. The
first is that when criteria of allocation other than willingness
to pay are used, it is very difficult to decide which uses (or
users) of a resource would be most productive. To answer administratively such questions as whether a piece of land would
be more valuable as a site of an apartment building or of a
shopping center is extraordinarily expensive and time consuming. In contrast, the price system produces an unambiguous and
usually quite satisfactory answer. The party in whose hands
the property will be most productive is the party who values
it most highly and is accordingly willing to pay the most for
it. ..
The second fundamental criticism of administrative allocation
is that it expands the role of government in society ....

One of

the principal attractions of the market is that it involves a minimum of governmental participation -ordinarily, a little beyond
the provisions of a judicial system
14
property rights.

. . .

to decide disputes over

Thus Professor Meyers urges state legislation making transfers
of water rights from one use to another, from one place to
another, easier.
We doubt that Meyers' faith in the efficacy of the market
is so widely held in Colorado, or for that matter in the United
States, as it was in the heyday of laissez faire in the late 19th
Century. Certainly there are many responsible citizens who
deplore the market's choices in the land development area in
the past 10 years. And there seems to be a growing sentiment
that administrative determinations, while expensive, are a desirable part of any future dispositions of scarce resources such
as land, minerals, and water.
Whether the State of Colorado chooses to give the market
free rein in disposition of natural resources or chooses to
attempt regulation of market transfers, changes in use, etc., is
obviously a political, not a legal, question.
This study does not attempt to deal with the merits of
the market economy's choices in redistributing water resources
in Colorado. Rather, it assumes that the role of government in
redistribution of water resources will increase. Accordingly, this
study will analyze the principles of Colorado water law as they
exist today in light of a heightened state interest in use and dis13 Id. at 3-4.
14Id. at 5.
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position of water rights, and will examine what legal restraints
exist which may limit assertion of that greater state interest.
I.

ELEMENTS OF APPROPRIATION AND THE NATURE

OF THE RIGHT CREATED

The constitution of Colorado in 1876 recognized and
adopted the doctrine of priority of right to water by priority of
appropriation. 15 The adoption of this system of water law was,
to an important degree, a confirmation of a pre-existing body
of law. The determination of what elements of the law of prior
appropriation are constitutionally ordained is necessary before
one can determine what is permissible by way of legislative
alteration of our water law.
The constitution contains these key elements of the doctrine
of prior appropriation:
1. All waters of natural streams are property of the
public and dedicated to the use of the people, subject to
appropriation.
2. An appropriation is the right to divert the unclaimed waters of natural streams, and the right to do so is
never to be denied.
3. In allocating waters to rival appropriators, priority
in time gives the better right.
4. Domestic users are to be "preferred" over agricultural users, and agricultural users are "perferred" over
manufacturing users. (This preference has been construed
to mean that a preferred user has the right to condemn
the vested water rights of others.)
These elements are obviously not self-explanatory. The
judicial and legislative processes have given meaning to them
in a manner very much like the evolution of English common
law. The principles of our water laws are not always traceable
to any explicit constitutional principles; however, variation
from what now exists has to be tested against the constitutional elements identified above. With this foreword, we proceed to an overview of the existing water law, from which one
may then attempt to determine the restrictions on any change
in our water law.
A.

Elements of a Water Right

Acquisition of a water right, as opposed to a court decree
for a water right, does not depend upon compliance with a
15 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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statutory procedure such as is required in "permit" states.10 In
theory, a Colorado water right is acquired by performing the
physical acts which constitute the appropriation, namely diverting water and applying it to a beneficial use.
It was early apparent that proof of priority of diversion
and beneficial use should be recorded in proceedings whereby
the respective priorities of rival appropriators could be finally
determined. But to require an appropriator to obtain a decree
posed a conceptual problem to the framers of our water law.
If actual appropriation depended on diversion and beneficial use,
then it was thought that the right so acquired could not be
destroyed by failure to resort to court proceedings. This problem was eventually glossed over by providing that the priorities
awarded in different adjudication proceedings should take
precedence according to date of adjudication. A failure to
appear and adjudicate one's right rendered the right junior to
those who did appear.' 7 The nonappearing appropriator suffered a subordination of priority, but his right still existed as
a junior right to those adjudicated.
The litigation associated with adjudication of water rights
has caused the terms "appropriation," "diversion," and "beneficial use" to become terms of art. An appropriation consists
of a diversion and a beneficial use of the water. Without the
presence of both elements, there is no perfected appropriation.
This definition seems to have been derived from that body of
prior appropriation law which predated the constitution. The
constitution, in article XVI, section 6, states that the "right to
divert" waters for "beneficial uses shall be never be denied";
this language is the sole constitutional source for elements of
an appropriation.
The 1969 Act gives this definition of an appropriation:
"Appropriation" means the diversion of a certain portion of the
waters of the state and the application of the same to a beneficial
use. 1 8

What constitutes a diversion has caused the courts some difficulty. Some early decrees made provision for stock watering
out of flowing streams, with no requirement that the water be
mechanically diverted from the stream. 9 The thirst of the
animals gave rise to the diversion. Also, natural overflows in
16 Cresson Consol. Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273,
338 P.2d 278 (1959).
17 Hardesty Reservoir, Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet
& Irrigated Land Co., 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929).
1
8COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(6) (Supp. 1969).
19 Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
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times of high water - a right to be flooded - have been recognized.A In Town of Genoa v. Westfall,2' the supreme court held
that "[t] he only indispensable requirements are that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a beneficial purpose
and actually applies them to that use."2 2 Unfortunately, this
liberal test was not followed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power Co. 23 There the
court held that maintaining a flow of water in a natural stream
for sustenance of fish life could not be an appropriation because
it did not entail a physical diversion from the stream. This
decision has been the principal impediment to protection of
wild or scenic rivers from full appropriation in their upper
reaches. The necessity of a mechanical impact on the flow of
water to constitute a diversion was codified by the 1969 Act:
"Diversion" or "divert" means removing water from its natural
course cr location, or controlling water in its natural course or
location, by means of a ditch, canal, flume, reservoir, bypass,
pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other structure or device. 24

Beneficial use has not been so firmly and apparently irretrievably defined. The supreme court has stated: "The term
'beneficial use' is not defined in the constitution. What is beneficial use, after all, is a question of fact and depends upon the
circumstances in each case."125 The constitution specifically
identifies four beneficial uses: domestic, agricultural, manufacturing, and mining.2 6 The case law has considered other uses
as beneficial, including diversion of water for propagation of
fish,2 T watering grass in a city park, 28 "municipal" uses,'2) generating power, 30 and milling. 3' The 1969 Act adopts a very
general definition of beneficial use:
(7) "Beneficial use" is the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices
to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the diversion
is lawfully made and without limiting the generality of the fore2) United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 449 F.2d 1
(10th Cir. 1971); Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370
(1960).
21 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
22 Id. at 547, 349 P.2d at 378.
23 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(5)
(Supp. 1969).
25 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
26

(1939).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 6, 7.

27 Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).

City & County of Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44 (1914).
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
:11Sternberger v. Seaton Mining Co., 45 Colo. 401, 102 P. 168 (1909).
31 City of Telluride v. Blair, 33 Colo. 353, 80 P. 1053 (1905).
28

29
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going, shall include the impoundment of water for recreational
32
purposes, including fishery or wildlife.

In applying what it thought to be Colorado law, a federal
court held that the scenic value of a waterfall was not a
beneficial use for which a claimant could acquire a water
right. 3 As a result another appropriator was entitled to deplete
the stream before it reached the waterfall.
Colorado water law is accordingly vulnerable to the criticism of the Review Draft of the National Water Commission,
namely, that state law is wrongheaded in its failure to provide
recognition and protection for the social values of water. Two
specific recommendations of the Review Draft are worth
34
noting:
1. State property rules relating to water should authorize water
rights to be acquired for all social uses, noneconomic as well as
economic. In particular, recreation, scenic, esthetic, water
quality, fisheries, and similar instream values are kinds of social
uses, heretofore neglected, which require protection. As these
values, and rights in them, are recognized and protected in
natural lakes and streams, their benefits should be clearly mandated for general public use, particularly when they are uniquely
suited to such uses.
3. Public rights should be secured through state legislation
authorizing administrative withdrawal or public reservation of
sufficient unappropriated water needed for minimum streamflows in order to maintain scenic values, water quality, fishery
resources, and the natural stream environment in those watercourses, or parts thereof, that have primary value for these
purposes. 3 5
B.

Transmountain Diversions

The

problems

recommendations

associated
in

with

Colorado turn

implementation
to a

large

of

degree

these
on the

political and legal tangle involved in transmountain diversions.
The use of water in its basin of origin is to a large degree
compatible with preservation of the environmental values recommended by the National Water Commission.

The location of

transmountain diversion works at high elevations on the West-

ern Slope, on the other hand, can disrupt those values.

Their

32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3 (7) (Supp. 1969). In the celebrated
fish case, where failure to make a diversion from the stream was fatal
to the appropriation, the Rocky Mountain Power Co. also argued that
sustenance of fish life was not a beneficial use. The supreme court did
not specifically deal with this point. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 136, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
33 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir.
1913).
34 This appears to be inconsistent with the National Water Commission's
endorsement of the market place as a favored mechanism for reallccating water use.
85 NWC 7-115 to -116.
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location has been dictated by economics and practicality.
Willingness to accommodate environmental considerations on
the part of new transmountain diverters may be expected to
grow as water becomes more scarce.
The significant fact about transmountain diversions is that
in Colorado general principles of the appropriation doctrine
control. The basin of origin has no right to receive the natural
flows of those steams.3 6 The right to appropriate water from
one river basin for use in another basin is clear in Colorado.
From the earliest reported cases to the present day, the Coloado Supreme Court has upheld an appropiator's right to make
use of water without geographical limitation. This result is
perfectly consistent with the theory of prior appropriation, for
it is a doctrine founded on the right to remove waters from
a stream. There is no language in the Colorado constitution
which implies any restriction that water be used in its basin
of origin, and the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly and
unequivocally upheld the rights of transmountain appropriators. In Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association v.
Colorado River Water Conservation District,37 dealing primarily
with conditional decrees for water rights to be used in transmountain diversions, the court stated, in response to an argument that the City and County of Denver had no right to make
transmountain diversions:
We find nothing in the Constitution which even intimates
that waters should be retained for use in the watershed where

originating.
The waters here involved are the property of the public,
not any segment thereof, nor are they dedicated to any geo-

graphical portion of the state.
The right to appropriate water and put the same to bene38
ficial use at any place in the state is no longer open to question.

The legality of transmountain diversions under the state
constitution is therefore settled. What is not settled (because
it has never been attempted) is the constitutionality of a legislative prohibition against future transmountain diversions by
private appropriators. A leading early case on the absence
of any geographical restriction on place of use of water assumes that the legislature is competent to limit diversions to
the natural basin of the water. 39 However, the language in the
36 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939);

Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
37 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
38 Id. at 202, 365 P.2d at 288-89.
39

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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Metropolitan Suburban case would
40
approach.

seem to foreclose

that

We have no doubt that to curtail or prohibit diversions
under existing transmountain water rights would amount to a
"taking" of property under the constitution. Whether the state
has the power to condemn these rights is discussed later in
this report.
The only existing statutory limitation on transmountain
diversions applies to water conservancy districts. The relevant
statute is contained in the provisions for formation and operation of water conservancy districts:
However, any works or facilities planned and designed for the
exportation of water from the natural basin of the Colorado
river and its tributaries in Colcrado, by any district created
under this article, shall be subject to the provisions of the Colorado river compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Any
such works or facilities shall be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the present appropriations of water, and
in addition thereto prospective uses of water for irrigation and
other beneficial consumptive use purposes, including consumptive uses for domestic, mining and industrial purposes, within the
natural basin of the Colorado river in the state of Colorado, from
which water is exported, will not be impaired nor increased in
ccst at the expense of the water users within the natural basin.
The facilities and other means for the accomplishment of said
purpose shall be incorporated in, and made a part of any
project plans for the exportation of water from said natural basin
41
in Colorado.

This provision embodies the principle of "compensatory storage," which in essence requires that any such district constructing a transmountain diversion project must in the course
of such development construct storage reservoirs sufficient to
provide for reasonably anticipated future needs of the area
from which the water is diverted without any increased expense to the users in that area. The purpose of compensatory
storage is to protect water users in areas of origin against the
threat of damage from transmountain diversions. The principle
came into the law as a concession to Western Slope interests at
the time the Colorado-Big Thompson project was under consideration in the late 1930's.42 The Fryingpan Arkansas project
also provides for compensatory storage at Ruedi Reservoir, and
for releases by the project to compensate for transmountain
diversion rights previously perfected by the Twin Lakes Reser40 Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Con-

servation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
150-5-13(2)(d) (1963).
Biese, Contemporary Storage, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 453 (1950).

41 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
42
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voir and Canal Co. at its Independence Pass diversion works. 43
Compensatory storage places an additional burden on conservancy districts contemplating transmountain diversions. The
statute does not apply to private appropriators or municipalities. Thus, compensatory storage requirements do not apply
to Denver's transmountain diversions.
Even its applicability to conservancy districts is now under
attack. Central Colorado Water Conservancy District was recently denied conditional decrees for transmountain diversions
because it made no provision for compensatory storage.44 We
are informed that an appeal from this ruling challenging the
constitutionality of this statute is pending.4 5 It is quite possible
that the court will not have to decide the case on constitutional
grounds, for as a creature of statute, the conservancy district
may well be held without capacity to challenge its organic act
and the limitations thereby imposed.
Confronted with a legal system which permitted transmountain diversions, Western Slope interests attempted to limit
these projects by the terms of various decrees entered. In City
& County of Denver v. Sheriff 4 -an attempt to limit a Denver
transmountain decree to usage only when Denver's Eastern
Slope rights were insufficient for its needs was struck down.
The supreme court held that "geographical advantage" did not
apply to water, and that Denver, as an appropriator, was
entitled to a full, unfettered property right for its Western
Slope appropriation.
It is worth noting that transmountain water is peculiarly
valuable. The special status of water that is imported into a
stream system from another stream system was signalled in
Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood.4 7 Englewood sought a
decree permitting change of point of diversion for certain water
rights in the South Platte River, which it had purchased in
order to develop a water supply independent of that of Denver.
One contention raised in opposition to the change was that if
Englewood were permitted to make the change and develop its
own water supply, it would no longer need water from Denver,
and Denver would consequently need to import less water from
H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of Central Colorado
Water Conservancy District, W-48 (Garfield County District Court, Oct.
26, 1972).
45 At the time of this writing a motion for new trial is pending.
46 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
47 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
43
44
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the Western Slope, thereby decreasing the amount of waste
and return flow water accruing to the South Platte River from
Western Slope sources to the alleged detriment of Eastern Slope
appropriators. The supreme court dismissed this contention,
stating that "appropiators on a stream have no vested right
to a continuance of importation of foreign water which another
has brought to the watershed." 48 This statement reflects the
general principle that water which an appropriator brings to
a stream from a foreign source, which otherwise would not
reach the stream, may be used by that appropriator without
regard to the claims of other appropriators on the stream, and
that appropriators on a stream do not have any right to the
49
continuance of such imported water.
Attention has recently focused on the rights of a municipality importing water by means of a transmountain diversion
to recycle that water or make more than one use of it before
discharging any return flow into Eastern Slope streams. In
1969 the following statute was enacted:
Right to reuse of imported water.- Whenever an appropriator
has heretofore, or shall hereafter lawfully introduce foreign
water into a stream system from an unconnected stream system,
such appropriator may make a succession of uses of such water
by exchange or otherwise to the extent that its volume can be
distinguished from the volume of the streams into which it is
introduced. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair
or diminish any water right which has become vested. 50

This statute patently approves the concept of multiple use of
transmountain water, and in so doing it is consistent with the
general law relating to imported or independently developed
water.
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case reinforced the effect
of this statute, and in fact declared that the right to reuse may
exist even independently of the statute. In City & County of
Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co.5 1 the primary issue was
whether Denver could make more than one use of its imported
water and dispose of it in whatever manner it saw fit after
such use. The court defined three types of use of water which
were in question: re-use (subsequent use of imported water
for the same purpose as the original use), successive use (subsequent use for a different purpose), and the right of disposiId. at 377, 237 P.2d at 122.
See San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Prairie Ditch Co. & Rio Grande
Drainage Dist., 84 Colo. 99, 268 P. 533 (1928); Ironstone Ditch Co. v.
Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 140 P. 177 (1914).
50
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-6 (Supp. 1969).
5' 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972).
48

49
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tion (the right to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of
effluent containing foreign water after distribution to the city
water system and collection in its sewer system). The court
held that all three types of actions were permissible, and that
they would be permissible even independent of the 1969 statute.
The city's right to take such action, however, was qualified by
its obligation to honor existing contractual obligations to the
contrary.
In summary, the present law in Colorado is that transmountain diversions may be made, subject only to the general
rules of appropriation and, in the case of conservancy districts,
to the requirement of compensatory storage. Transmountain
water may be used freely by the appropriator, and it may be
used more than once by the appropriator unless some act of
the appropriator constitutes a surrender of that right to re-use.
The most significant aspect of the law of transmountain
diversions is that the right to make such diversions is now
regarded as an incident of the prior appropriation system. The
reported Colorado cases do not consider the constitutionality
of legislative restrictions on transmountain diversions by appropriators. If transmountain diversions were to be limited
by statutes generally protecting the basin of origin against
all "foreign" appropriators, we would anticipate a strong constitutional challenge, the argument being that an attempt to
give geographical advantage conflicts with the dedication of
waters of the state to appropriation, and conflicts with the constitutional absolute guarantee of the right to divert unappropriated waters.
The likelihood of the court sustaining these constitutional
arguments is very high. If the people of Colorado wish to
limit new appropriations for transmountain diversions, the only
certain method is by appropriate constitutional amendment.
A statutory effort alone seems likely to fail.
C.

The Property Right in Water

Prior appropriation is the law of "first in time, first in
right." Article XVI, section 6, of the constitution provides:
"Priority of appropriation shall give the better right . . . ." Accordingly, priority to the use of water has therefore been
characterized by the courts as a property right.
Property rights in water consist not alone in the amount of the
appropriation, but, also, in the priority of the appropriation. It
often happens that the chief value of an appropriation consists

in its priority over other appropriations from the same natural
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stream. Hence, to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive
him of a most valuable property right. . . . A priority of right
to the use of water being property, is protected by our constitution so that no person can be deprived of it without "due process
52
of law."

Although the Colorado courts have consistently agreed
that a priority to the use of water is a property right, there
has been some confusion as to the nature of that right. As
property, its owner may sell it, separate and apart from the
land, or change the place of use or point of diversion, as
long as rights of other appropriators are not injured. 53

It is not

a mere revocable privilege, and the right to changes in place of
use or point of diversion are not dependent on statutes, but are
an inherent incident of ownership. 54

It

is often described as a

usufructuary interest:
[A]fter appropriation the title to this water, save, perhaps, as to
the limited quantity that may be actually flowing in the consumer's ditch or lateral, remains in the general public, while
the paramount right to its use, unless forfeited, continues in the
appropriator. 55

The right has been variously characterized as a freehold, 5 an
interest in real estate, 57 and a property right lacking the dignity of an estate in fee.58 When reduced to possession, as when
diverted into a ditch or reservoir, water takes on the character
of personal property. 59
The property right in water is specific, referring to a quantity of water, a point of diversion, a specific time period within
which it can be used, and often a particular use. A basic
limitation on the property right in water is that an appropriator
acquires the right to only that quantity of water which he puts
52 Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 27, 34 P. 278, 280 (1893).
53 Sherwood Irrigation Co. v. Vandewark, 138 Colo. 261, 331 P.2d 810
(1958); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan
& Trust Co., 79 Colo. 511, 246 P. 781 (1926); Seven Lakes Reservoir Co.
v. New Loveland & Greeley Irrigation & Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 P.
485 (1907); Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 12 Colo. 12, 19 P.
836 (1888).
54 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
55 Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 587-88, 17 P. 487,
489 (1887) (emphasis added).
56 Gutheil Park Inv. Co. v. Town of Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050
(1904); Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Leshes, 28 Colo. 273, 65 P. 44
(1901); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., 22
Colo. App. 364, 123 P. 831 (1912).
57 West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947);
Talcott v. Martin, 20 Colo. App. 488, 79 P. 973 (1905).
58 Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279
P.2d 420 (1955).
59 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
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to beneficial use. For example, a right to the use of water for
irrigation is limited in time and volume by the needs of the
land, and the limitation is said to be read into every decree
declaring such a right.60 When the needs of the land are satisfied, the water must no longer be used by the appropriator, but
must be permitted to flow uninterruptedly in the natural channel of the stream. 61 The amount of water which by careful
management and use is reasonably required to be applied to any
given tract of land in order to assure proper irrigation is frequently referred to as the duty of water.6 2 This is not a hard
and fast unit of measurement, but varies according to conditions. This doctrine is clear enough with regard to agricultural
users (although it can hardly be said to be rigidly enforced),
but the applicability of these concepts to municipal water
decrees is not clear. In at least one reported case, the supreme
court indicated that municipalities enjoyed special privileges
63
with respect to standards of use.
Just as a decree is only evidence of an absolute water right,
it is quite likely that a conditional decree is only evidence of a
conditional water right. This conclusion is certainly implied in
Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. White River Electric Association,6
where a mere applicant for a conditional decree was held to
have a vested property right entitling that applicant to contest
(and presumably to be protected) in a change of point of diversion proceeding sought by a prior appropriator. The logical
extension of this holding is that one who has done sufficient
acts entitling him to a conditional decree also has a property
right for which he must be compensated if it were destroyed.
If a mere applicant has such a property right, then it follows
that a decreed conditional right is in an equal position.
D. Conditional Water Rights
Very early Colorado recognized that some planned appropriations would take substantial time to complete, and that to
refuse to secure such claims a place in the priority system
would militate against the undertaking of desirable projects.
Accordingly, the concept of the conditional decree was devel6

ONew Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 40 P. 989 (1895).
61 Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120
Colo. 423, 210 P.2d 982 (1949); New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21
Colo. 357, 40 P. 989 (1895).
62 Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
63 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
But see Baker v. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930).
64 151 Colo. 45, 376 P.2d 158 (1962).
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oped.""' A claimant who establishes a firm intent to appropriate
certain waters and undertakes certain acts in furtherance of his
plan is, upon completion of his appropriation, entitled "to relate
back" his priority date to the time he launched his project.
A conditional decree evidencing this right to relate back can
be obtained so that the claimant can make his investment with
security. If and when the appropriation is perfected, the holder
of the conditional decree may obtain an absolute decree. While
the decree is conditional, the claimant must proceed with due
diligence in prosecuting his appropriation.
This area of the law has led to considerable litigation and
a considerable body of case law. What constitutes the "first
step" entitling the claimant to a date to which he may relate
back is a question of fact determined by the court in light of
all the circumstances.'; In City & County of Denver v. Northern
0 T
it was held that "the
Colorado Water Conservancy District,
right may relate back to the time when the first open step was
taken giving notice of intent to secure it." ' s The element of
intent to appropriate must be accompanied by some physical
demonstration of the intent and whether these have accrued
is to be determined on an ad hoc basis69 Whether due diligence
in perfecting the appropriation has been exercised is also a
question of fact; the size and complexity of the project, the
extent of the construction season, the availability of materials,
labor and equipment, the economic ability of the claimant, and
the intervention of outside delaying factors such as wars, strikes,
and litigation 'are all to be considered in making such
determination. °
E.

Preferences

Colorado, like most appropriation states, recognizes a hierarchy of right to use of water. Unlike many other states,
however, in Colorado the hierarchy is established by the
constitution:
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters
of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for
domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming
6,Sieber v. Frank, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 (1883).
Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 484 P.2d 1211 (1971).
130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954).
Id. at 388. 276 P.2d at 999.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power
Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971).
7" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970).
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for any other purpose, and those using water for agricultural
purposes shall have preference over those using the same for
71
manufacturing purposes.

Although the Colorado constitution would on a literal reading appear to grant an absolute preference in water to domestic
uses - as, in fact, is the case in some riparian states - the
Colorado cases construing this provision have limited the preference to a right to condemn for a superior use upon the payment of just compensation.
This interpretation is a judicial development. The history
of this development is significant; accordingly it is traced in
some detail.
In Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs,72 the City of Colorado Springs sought to add to its decreed municipal water supply certain existing irrigation water rights. One of the points
raised on appeal was:
To the extent the use made by the city is purely for domestic
purposes, has it the right, without compensation, to take waters
73
theretofore appropriated for agricultural purposes?

Colorado Springs claimed a right to do so by virtue of the constitutional preference. The court appeared to put great stock
in the fact that the water rights which Colorado Springs wanted
had vested prior to adoption of the constitution, and\ this fact
"exempted this case" from constitutional preference. Thus,
property rights in water which had arisen prior to the state
constitution could not be taken without compensation. This
holding was founded on the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and upon Sections 3, 15, and 25 of the Colorado constitution's Bill of Rights.
Although the opinion is based on the inability of an 1876
constitutional provision to affect a pre-1876 right (and hence,
one would think, on the assumption that post-1876 rights could
be taken for preferential uses without compensation), the penultimate paragraph expressly reserves any ruling on such takings of post-1876 rights:
From anything that we have predicted upon the fact that the
water-rights desired by the city antedate the adoption of our
constitution, we are not to be understood as intimating that, if

art. XVI, § 6. This arrangement is quite different from
that of Oregon, which has by statute adopted a more sophisticated
preference scheme favoring multiple uses over single purpose uses,
upstream uses over downstream, and requiring the maintenance of
minimum stream flow for the preservation of aquatic life. ORE. REV.
STAT. § 536.310 (1971).
72 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891).
73 Id. at 66-67, 26 P. at 315.
71 COLO. CONST.
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the contrary had been the fact, the rule requiring compensation

to be made when such rights are taken for a higher use would
be different. 74The determination of this question is not involved
in this case.
The next preference case, Armstrong v. Larimer County
Ditch Co., 75 was decided shortly after Strickler. The Larimer
Ditch Co. maintained a ditch for irrigating and domestic purposes, and thereby served approximately 200 families, many of
whom depended on the ditch for their sole supply of domestic
water. Its priority was a junior one on the Cache La Poudre. The
water commissioner ordered the headgate of the Larimer Ditch
closed in order that the flow of the stream be available for
senior rights. The Larimer Ditch then obtained an order restraining this act and a decree that it was entitled to water
sufficient for the domestic needs of those served by it.
On appeal the court was moved by the fact that rights
injured by the Larimer Ditch's claim had vested prior to the
adoption of the constitution:
The error into which the learned judge seems to have fallen
was in regarding these constitutional provisions [article XVI,
sections 5, 6] as retrospective, and so far retroactive as to impair,
if not destroy, property rights acquired long before its adoption.
Such cannot be its construction. It must be construed to be
rights and powers
declaratory of, and not destructive of, the
76
enjoyed by the people before its adoption.

The court held that section 5 recognized the rights of prior
appropriators, and that to allow the Larimer Ditch the decree
it sought under section 6 would destroy what had been granted
in section 5, and would be contradictory to article II, section
15, which requires compensation for takings of private property.
In Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,77 the Montrose Canal claimed, by virtue of the preference system, to have
the constitutional right to divert 50 c.f.s. of water regardless of
priority for domestic use, and sought to deprive the Loutsenhizer Ditch of its senior decreed irrigation priority. The
supreme court disagreed:
[The preference] is not intended . . . to authorize a diversion of
water for domestic use from the public streams of the state, by
means of large canals, as attempted in this case. The use protected by the constitution is such use as the riparian owner has
at common law to take water for himself, his family or his
stock, and the like. And if the term "domestic use" is to be given
a different or greater meaning than this, then as between such
74 Id. at 74-75, 26 P. at 318.
75 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 P. 235 (1891).
7,;
Id. at 58, 27 P. at 238.

-723 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896).
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enlarged use and those having prior rights for agricultural and
manufacturing purposes, it is subject to that other constitutional
provision requiring just compensation to those whose rights are
78
affected thereby.

The court noted that in Strickler v. Colorado Springs the
preferences were held inapplicable to pre-1876 rights, and that
such prior rights were entitled to compensation before there
could be a valid taking. The court did expand this holding
to include compensation for senior rights acquired since 1876;
however, its reasoning was partly based on the notion that communities desiring to invoke the preference would be wasteful
in effecting their diversions.
In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 79 the
petitioner brought a quiet title suit against the Town of Sterling,
and sought to quiet title in certain spring water for domestic
and irrigation uses first made by the petitioner in 1898. Sterling
contended that it was entitled to the spring waters without
compensating the petitioner. It based its defense on the preferences and upon a statute authorizing towns to take water to
supply domestic needs of inhabitants, which provided:
[I]f the taking of such water in such quantity shall materially
interfere with, or impair, the vested right of any person or persons, or corporation, heretofore acquired, residing upon such
creek, gulch, or stream, or doing any milling or manufacturing
business thereon, they shall first obtain the consent of such
person or persons, or corporation, or acquire the right of domain
by condemnation as prescribed by the constitution and laws upon
that subject, and make full compensation or satisfaction for all
the damages thereby occasioned to such person or persons, or
corporation.8 0

The statute became effective July 3, 1877, and Sterling argued
that since any rights of the petitioner did not arise until 1898,
the petitioner's interest was acquired subject to divestiture to
any town, without compensation.
The court held that such an interpretation of the statute
would make it "clearly unconstitutional." The preference for
domestic use
does not entitle one desiring to use water for domestic purposes
...
to take it from another who has previously appropriated it
for some other purpose, without just compensation ....
That a
city or town cannot take water for domestic purposes which has
been previously appropriated for some other beneficial purpose,
78

Id. at 237, 48 P. at 534.

79 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
80

An Act to amend an Act entitled "Towns and Cities," § 2, [1874] Colo.
Sess. Laws 10th Sess. (now COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 139-32-1(78) (Supp.
1969)).
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without fully compensating the owner, is so clear that further
8
discussion seems almost unnecessary. 1

With regard to a harder question, that is, the right of Sterling
to take water that was already used for domestic purposes, the
court's approach was more cautious:
The right of a city to divert water for the use of its inhabitants
is not superior to the right of an individual, or a farming community, to divert water for domestic or other purposes, in the
sense that the city make take water for that purpose from those
who have previously appropriated it for the same, or some other,
8 2
beneficial use, without compensating the senior appropriators.

The import of this dictum is that a city or town can take al
individual's domestic water supply if the city or town were
willing to pay compensation and proceed by eminent domain.
Black v. Taylor83 is the last significant case in which the
preference is considered. The supreme court there stated:
Some basis for confusion of thought may be found in the opinion
of this court in Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23
Colo. 233, 48 Pac. 532, in which the court said, with reference to
the domestic use of water: "The use protected by the Constitution is such use as the riparian owner has at common law to take
water for himself, his family or his stock, and the like." However, following our opinion in Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339, there can be no doubt
concerning the right to appropriate water for domestic purposes
and the interpretation to be given the constitutional preference
relating to such appropriations. Such water user cannot be preferred over a prior appropriator for irrigation purposes without
fully compensating the senior appropriator for the loss sustained
84
by invoking the preference.

A number of hard questions with regard to the preference
system have not been confronted by the Colorado courts. Those
who have sought additional water have resorted either to
development of new appropriations or purchase in the market
of existing rights. There are no reported cases in which a water
user invoked the constitutional preference in aid of a condemnation action.
It is possible that the preference might also be a protection
against condemnation. Since domestic users are preferred, an
attempt to condemn an existing domestic right for agricultural
or manufacturing purposes might be resisted on the grounds
that the constitution shields domestic uses from conversion to
a less preferred use. This prospect is startling in that if pushed
81 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-27,

94 P. 339, 340-41 (1908)

(emphasis added).

82 Id. at 427, 94 P. at 341.

83 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953).
84 Id. at 457, 264 P.2d at 506.
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to this extreme conclusion, the preference would limit the
state's acquisition of water rights by condemnation if the state's
purpose were not a preferred (domestic or agricultural) one.
Thus, there is a possible conflict between the sovereign power
of eminent domain over private property, and a constitutionally
protected use for a certain kind of property.
As a general matter, the power of eminent domain is the
inherent authority of a nation or sovereign state to take, or
authorize the taking of, private property for public use without
the owner's consent. This power is inherent in the State of
Colorado as an attribute of its sovereignty, and the Colorado
constitution, article II, section 15, has been construed as limiting a pre-existing power.8 5 The State of Colorado is also limited
in the exercise of its eminent domain powers by the due process
requirements of the Federal Constitution. s 6
Other than by constitutional or statutory grant of the
power, no lesser entity of government has the power of eminent
domain. Thus, a municipality has no inherent right of condemnationY7 The grant of the right must be clearly expressed
88
or necessarily implied.
The Colorado constitution makes several specific grants
of the eminent domain power. For example, article XVI, section 7 grants all persons and corporations the right to condemn
a right-of-way across public, private, or corporate lands for construction of ditches, canals, and flumes for conveying water for
domestic, irrigation, mining, manufacturing, and drainage purposes. This grant is self-executing in that it does not depend
upon any statutory enactment for implementation.8 9 The availability of the grant to private persons is confirmed in article
II, section 14:
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by
consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and
except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the
lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or
sanitary purposes. 90

Article XX, the home rule amendment for cities and towns,
85 Colacino v. People, 80 Colo. 417, 252 P. 350 (1927).
86 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613

(1935).
87 Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732

(1952).
88 Potashnik v. Public Serv. Co., 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
89 Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 54 Colo. 112, 129 P. 198 (1913).
!o

COLO. CONST. art. III, §1 14. The United States does not consider its
property subject to this Colorado grant of eminent domain powers.
Users of United States' lands uniformly obtain special use permits
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also delegates to entities organized thereunder full power to
exercise eminent domain to attain any lawful public, local, or
municipal purpose. This grant is to some degree limited to the
attainment of local purposes, and may be superseded by the
legislature when the concern or purpose becomes of statewide,
and not merely local, interest21
Case law indicates that the preference system is only a
grant to preferred users of a right to exercise the power of
eminent domain. What has been expressly decided is that the
preference cannot be invoked to divest other rights without
payment of compensation. No reported case involves a condemnation of a water right with payment of compensation tendered.
Accordingly, the precise operation of the preference system is
an unknown. The resolution of this problem probably only
becomes necessary if the State of Colorado should determine to
attempt condemnation proceedings against preferred rights. If
the state's goals can be constitutionally achieved without condemnation, then the precise workings of the preference system
can await future determination.
F. Changes in Water Rights
The increasing demand for water and the scarcity of further
'unappropriated" waters point to increasing market pressure
on existing decreed rights. Sales and conversions of senior agricultural rights to uses the market now prefers are likely to
multiply. Colorado law accommodates this process in statutory
proceedings known, since passage of the 1969 Act, as "changes
in water rights." Prior to the 1969 Act, a similar result was
2
obtained by "change in point of diversion" proceedings
As a general proposition, the owner of a water right is free
to exercise it just as the owner of a fee interest in land may put
it to the use he chooses. However, Colorado water law very
early in its history developed a significant limitation on changes
in use of water rights that had no precise equivalent in use of
and rights-of-way pursuant to federal law. It is worthy of note that
the United States appears to be showing more reluctance to grant these
special use permits when environmental damage is alleged. In the case
of new transmountain diversions, a major hurdle is obtaining the right
to traverse forest lands. A condition that the Forest Service apparently
intends to attach to future permits is the requirement of release of
sufficient stream flows to sustain forest values below the diversion.
Whether the Forest Service will be successful in this new approach remains to be seen.
31 City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958);
People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941); People ex rel
Carlson v. City Council, 60 Colo. 370, 153 P. 690 (1915).
92 Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).
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land."" This limitation is that no change in a water right is to
be permitted if the change will injuriously affect the rights of
4
other appropriators on the streamf
Decrees for water rights as a general matter specify particular uses, such as irrigation, for the water right. Also, it is a
recognized principle that a water right is limited by its historic
use pattern. 5 Accordingly, a water right owner is from the
outset limited in his nature of use by his decree and past
practices.
In making all changes the subject of "change of water right"
proceedings under the 1969 Act, the legislature in large part
adopted and codified the existing case law of changes in point
of diversion.
The United States Constitution contains no specific reference to water rights; however, the basic protections of property
afforded by the Constitution are applicable to water rights.
This Federal Constitutional protection derives from the fifth
and fourteenth amendments which assure that there shall be no
taking of private property without compensation and due process
of law.
The Colorado constitution does of course deal specifically
with water rights, but it makes no reference to changes in water
rights. Accordingly, the origin of the right to change a water
right was not pinned to any constitutional provision; rather,
the right to change was treated as an incident of ownership of
property. 6
The 1969 Act is the present statute providing the mechanisms for legal recognition of changes of water rights. It defines
changes of water rights very broadly:
"Change of water right" means a change in the type, place, or
time of use, a change in the point or points of diversion, a change
from a fixed point or points of diversion to alternate or supple93 Land owners are limited by nuisance laws and these are perhaps the

nearest equivalent.
94 Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 171 Colo. 304, 467 P.2d 267 (1970);
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575,
272 P.2d 629 (1954); City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289,
249 P.2d 151 (1952) ; Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo.
366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951); Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 93
Colo. 246, 26 P.2d 102 (1933); City & County of Denver v. Colorado
Land & Livestock Co., 86 Colo. 191, 279 P. 46 (1929); New Cache La
Poudre Irrigating Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 49 Colo. 1, 111
P. 610 (1910); Diez v. Hartbauer, 46 Colo. 599, 105 P. 868 (1909); Cache
La Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161,
53 P. 331 (1898); Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26
P. 313 (1891).
"5 City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
06 Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 41 Colo. 212, 93 P. 483
(1907).
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mental points of diversion, a change from alternate or supple-

mental points of diversion to a fixed point or points of diversion, a change in the means of diversion, a change in the place
or places of storage, a change from direct application to storage
and subsequent application, a change from storage and subsequent application to direct application, a change from a fixed
place or places of storage to alternate places of storage, a change
from alternate places of storage to a fixed place or places of
storage, or any combination of such changes. The term "change
of water right" includes changes of conditional water rights as
97
well as changes of water rights.

The statute contemplates that any person desiring such
change of water right shall seek judicial approval. A change is
to be allowed if it "will not injuriously affect the owner of or
persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a
decreed conditional water right." 9 If a proposed change would
cause such injury, and certain conditions may be imposed on
the change which would prevent such injury, the change is to be
permitted subject to those conditions. 9 The statute adopts the
guidelines of prior case law in giving examples of appropriate
conditions: limitations on the use of the water right, relinquishment of part of the decree to compensate other protesting appropriators, time limitations on the proposed diversion, and
any other conditions that "may be necessary to protect the
vested rights of others."'10 0 Any party to a proceeding in which a
change is sought is to have the opportunity to present conditions which may alleviate such injury.
The 1969 Act reflects what has been the law of Colorado
for many years, namely, that the holder of a water right may
change his exercise of that right, but only to the extent that
no other appropriator, junior or senior, suffers any adverse
effect on his vested rights. This constitutes a very significant
limitation on the exercise of a water right as a property right.
The statutory rule has its origins in the case law's recognition of a water right as a property right. Once the analogy to a
property right in land is made, it logically follows that the
owner can exercise dominion by making changes in the uses
to which he put his property. Thus, in Brighton Ditch Co. v.
City of Englewood,1° 1 the supreme court stated that the right to
change the place of use and point of diversion of a water right
"is an inherent property right, not conferred by our remedial
97 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(11) (Supp. 1969).
98 COLO. REV.STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(3) (Supp. 1969).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21 (3), (4) (Supp. 1969).

100 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(4) (Supp. 1969).
101 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
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statute, but pre-existing as an incident of ownership, and always
enforceable so long as the vested rights of others are not in'10 2
juriously affected.
If the only change is a change in ownership, there is no
limitation on that right to transfer, and there is no requirement
of approval from the water court.10 3 Conveyance of water
separate from the land, however, almost invariably is accompanied by some type of change in use, either in the purpose for
which the water is used, the place at which the water is used,
or the point at which the water is diverted. Those changes are
strictly limited to protect the rights of all other (junior and
senior) appropriators on the particular stream system.
The salient fact regarding changes in water rights under
existing law is that all restrictions on changes are designed to
protect other private water rights owners from injury. Research
does not disclose one case where changes were restricted or
denied in order to accommodate the proprietary interest of the
"public" or the "people" in water. The litigation on changes
has been purely a property quarrel between private interests,
with the express object of protecting vested rights.
Until adoption of the 1969 Act, standing to contest a change
in point of diversion was clearly limited to those alleging injury
to vested rights. As the court stated in Brighton Ditch Co. v.
City of Englewood, "No protestant may properly object to
change of point of diversion on grounds that others than himself would be harmed thereby.' 10 4 That result was consistent
with the then governing statute on changes in point of diversion. 10 5 As is discussed elsewhere in this article, the 1969 Act
may have liberalized this rule on standing, for it permits "any
person" to file a statement of opposition, and "any person interested" to participate in a trial on the matter before the water
court.10 6

II. WHAT IS THE STATE OF COLORADO'S INTEREST IN WATER
The language of the Colorado constitution'0 7 purports to
102 Id. at 372-73, 237 P.2d at 120.
103 As a consequence, the State Engineer has no accurate information on who
owns what water rights.
104 124 Colo. 366, 372, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951).
105 Law of April 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 24, [1943] Colo. Sess. Laws 630, repealed,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9 (Supp. 1969).
106 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (a)
(Supp. 1971), amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (Supp. 1969).
107
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated,
within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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give the public a property interest in the waters of the state.
Although the precise language might be read to mean that the
waters appropriated prior to the adoption of the constitution
are excluded from whatever property right the public has, it is
now generally thought that all waters are subject to the public
right. 108 However, by making waters which are property of the
public subject to appropriation, Colorado authorized the subsequent creation of private property rights in those waters. 10 9
The nature of the private property right created has been discussed above. In short, the legal theory is that the "people" or
the "public" own the waters, and that an appropriator owns a
priority to use of water."" This usufructuary right in the appropriator is a property right which can be taken or damaged only
upon payment of compensation. Colorado case law has concerned itself with creation and protection of private rights
and paid little heed to the public right. There is the distinct
possibility that the property rights (in any traditional sense)
remaining in the public by reason of ownership of the waters
of the state are not extensive.
Other appropriation states have not relegated the public
property interest in water to so insubstantial a position. In permit states, the state engineer is often authorized to refuse to
grant permits for water use if he determines the application is
not in the public interest. Utah has considered authorizing its
governor to withdraw from further appropriation waters flowing in segments of designated streams.11 1 This state power is
presumably based on the public's property interest in water. Mr.
Edward Clyde, in a legal study for the National Water Commission, notes:
While private rights can be acquired to use water, and while
these rights are property interests which are entitled to protection and cannot be taken without due process and payment of
just compensation, it is fundamental that the state has an
interest in the use of the water resource which justifies regulation to govern the manner in which the resource shall be used.
The concept that the state has a dominant interest in the use of
the water resource by private individuals has been a part of the
law of the West from the very beginning. .

.

. In

short, the

108 Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 490 P.2d 268 (Colo. 1971);

Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968). The Declaration of Policy to the 1969 Act does not limit the public's property right
to waters unappropriated at the time of adoption cf the constitution;
rather, "all" waters "have always been and are hereby declared to be
" COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1)
the property of the public ....
(Supp. 1969).
109 Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 30
P. 1032 (1892).
110 Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887).
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vital public concern in a wise and judicious use of the water
resource justifies and requires state regulation. 112

The Colorado constitution and cases decided thereunder pose
a number of obstacles in the path of a full implementation of
the Clyde thesis to Colorado water law. The early cases show
an inclination to regard a perfected appropriation in water as
the right to defeat the public's property right:
By such appropriation and by reason of the diversion and sep-

aration of the water from the volume of the stream the title of
the public or people was divested and the appropriator became

the owner. 113

This language is properly limitable to a holding that water
itself is unsusceptible to private ownership until diverted from
the stream, and before such diversion, the appropriator owns
only a right to divert. This traditional recitation does not, however, solve the problem, for if the right to divert is in private
hands, how can the state retain a right to stop future diversions? A partial answer to this question is that the state has the
undoubted power to halt wasteful or nonbeneficial uses.1 14
Athough very distinguished jurists 15 long ago called for
treatment of water as a public asset not subject to private ownership, Colorado to this day sanctions and encourages the creation of private property rights to use of water. The constitution
guarantees the right to divert unappropriated waters. The enunciated public policy of the state serves this end, for the Declaration of Policy to the 1969 Act states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado
that all waters originating in or flowing into this state, whether
found on the surface or underground, have always been and are
hereby declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriationand
use in accordance with law. As incident thereto, it shall be the
policy of this state to integrate the appropriation, use and administration of underground water tributary to a stream with
the use of surface water, in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state." 6

There appear to be significant limits on the extent of the
public right in water. To assert at this date that the State of
111

E.

CLYDE, ADMINISTRATiVE

ALLOCATION

OF WATER

49 (National Water

Commission Legal Study, 1972).
112 Id. at 31-33.
113 Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 497, 29 P. 906,
911 (1892).
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35 (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(7) (Supp. 1971).
115 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARV. L. REV. 195, 234 (1914).
6
11 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
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Colorado retains an overriding property right in waters previously appropriated by private persons, which overriding right
would authorize the state to destroy the interests of private
appropriators, appears untenable for two reasons. First, the
established law in Colorado clearly recognizes the property aspect of a water right; hence, it is not likely that the courts
would at this date sanction any new theory drastically expanding the nature and extent of the public's property rights at the
expense of private water rights previously created (vested
rights). Second, (although this is really not a legal observation)
it is doubted that the best interests of our society are served if
the State of Colorado, having acquiesced in the creation of
private property rights for 96 years, now attempts to advance a
"public" property right at the expense of citizens who acted,
presumably in good faith, and certainly with no indication of
state opposition, in acquiring private rights during that period.
It should be noted that the United States feels no such nice compunctions about asserting for itself ancient property rights in
water, unknown until legal theories invented only nine years
ago in Arizona v. California.117 Nevertheless, it is felt that the
example of the United States is unworthy of a sovereign, and
one should agree with the Review Draft of National Water Commission that if the sovereign chooses to take, for its own use,
water rights previously acquired under state law, it should
do so by condemnation, and pay value therefor 1 8
This is not to say the public's property right to waters is
best buried for all time. Not all regulation by the state is
confiscatory of private property. The public property right and
the State of Colorado's unquestioned "police" power under the
Federal and state Constitutions are authority for the proposition
that private water rights are subject to state regulation and
administration which are consistent with the constitutional protection of private property and the provisions of article XVI,
sections 5 and 6.119 The growth of governmental regulation of
property is a history of balancing legitimate state interests with
conflicting private property rights. 120 What is now matter-of117 376 U.S. 340 (1963).
118 NWC 13-5 et seq.

"9West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947).
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex
conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which

120

justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of auto-
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factly accepted by way of governmental activity would have
outraged lawyers and citizens of earlier eras. Thus far there
has been little regulation by government of water rights except
to justify curtailment of waste and nonbeneficial uses by private appropriators. That does not mean the power to do more
does not exist.
The unique language of the Colorado constitution has great
significance in any attempt to define constitutional regulation
of appropriations under these powers. Since the constitution
flatly states that the "right to divert unappropriated waters
shall never be denied," any attempt absolutely to prohibit new
appropriations, whether by a "moratorium" or a "withdrawal,"
would undoubtedly face challenge on that constitutional ground.
A moratorium with respect to perfection of pending conditional
decrees or claims and pending changes in water rights would
be challenged as a "taking" without compensation.
The reference to unappropriatedwater has led some persons
to suggest that the state might halt all new appropriations on
the theory that no unappropriated waters remain. This approach
does not appear promising for practical and legal reasons. The
"'new" water rights which could be affected by this tactic are
probably not substantial. Existing conditional decrees and pending claims for conditional decrees, if perfected, will probably
cause full appropriation of Colorado's streams. But if unappropriated waters are available, then there is a constitutional problem with the guarantee of the right to divert. The case law
indicates a literal interpretation of that proviso, for valid appropriations may be created after the flow of a stream is subject
to call for prior appropriators. 121 This holding was without
benefit of a statute whereby the availability of unappropriated
waters was determinable and relevant; however, the reasoning
of the case was that in an appropriation state, waters may in
the future become available (e.g., when seniors have no need or
in a flood), and hence the right to make an appropriation
mobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been
condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly ccming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should
be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving
due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
121 Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093
(1909).
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thereof could not properly be precluded.
One of the merits often suggested for a "permit" state, such
as Wyoming, is the power of the administrative authority to
withhold a permit on the ground that no waters are available
for appropriation. In conversation with C.J. Kuiper, the State
Engineer, Mr. Kuiper noted the anomaly that is now occurring
in Colorado: numerous conditional decrees are sought for water
rights the priority for which is so junior that in any strict
12
administration of priorities they will never be satisfied. 2
The continued creation of "unfillable" conditional decrees is
no doubt objectionable to administrators of state waters. In support of the existing system, one can argue that if no water is
ever available in fact to fill the claim, no absolute decree will
ever issue, for there will have been no diversion and application to beneficial use. But if in fact there are no more unappropriated waters in a given area, then it would appear a waste of
judicial effort to attend to the adjudications of these claims
when as a practical matter these conditional rights will not be
perfected.
With regard to new applications for surface water rights
in certain areas (e.g., the Arkansas River Basin), the Division
Engineer routinely opposes the award of further decrees on the
ground that there is no unappropriated water available to satisfy the decree. It also appears that the courts routinely disallow this objection on the theory that the constitution and the
rule in Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank 23 afford
appropriators the undeniable right to perfect further appropriations, even though the new priorities will be satisfied only in
the event of rare flood occasions. However, the approach is
quite different with regard to wells, where the State Engineer
has statutory authority to deny new permits to construct wells
when he finds that exercising the permit would cause injury
to other vested rights.124 Yet only by diverting (pumping)
water out of priority would a new well appear to injure vested
rights. This seeming inconsistency between the law on acquiring surface water rights and wells has not faced a constitu1 25
tional challenge.
Interview with C.J. Kuiper, Colorado State Engineer, in Denver, Colorado, Oct. 27, 1972.
123 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909).
124 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2)
(Supp. 1971).
121 The Colorado Supreme Court in Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo.
1973) upheld the State Engineer's denial of two well permits even
though no adverse effect to any individual vested right was proved;
only a general adverse effect to the stream was shown. This case has
thus resolved the point against potential ground water appropriators.
122
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Customarily, the State of Colorado has not appeared in
water proceedings to assert any interest of the "public" or the
"people" in either dispositions of the public waters to private
appropriators or changes of water rights. Until the 1969 Act,
adjudications of water rights and changes in point of diversion
were in practice mere contests between rival claimants for water
rights. The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that the general public had an interest in the outcome of these adjudication
suits, but attempts by litigants to assert those interests of the
public were rejected. 126 Under the rule in Arkansas Valley Co.
v. Hardesty Co. 127 one who opposed a water claim was constrained to justify his opposition by an allegation of injury to
his own water right.128
The relegation of the general public's interest to that of a
silent observer, unrepresented by counsel, which was to be protected, if at all, by the judge, is probably consistent enough
with the traditional underpinnings of the doctrine of appropriation, and the law's traditional hostility to "private attorneysgeneral." For, if the constitution provides that all water is
subject to appropriation by private interests on a first come,
first served basis, and if the constitution further provides that
the right to divert shall never be denied, then there is little
point in making adjudication suits anything other than a struggle amongst rival appropriators. It is only when one lacks confidence that any of the competing users will make the proper
use of the water resource that reason to challenge the traditional limitations on "standing" to be heard in water contests
arises.
The existing water law of Colorado does not recognize the
possibility that appropriators may seek to develop water rights
which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are nonetheless socially undesirable for the public at large. If the use
is "beneficial" in terms of the applicant's economic needs, that
suffices. The water law now assumes that all growth and
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
In this case, Western slope interests urged that by allowing Denver to
acquire further Colcrado River waters, the vital interests of the people
might be jeopardized. The supreme court refused to consider the notion
that taking water out of one basin might be contrary to the "people's"
interest.
127 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929).
128Bond v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 496 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1972).
The rule stated in the text applies to surface rights. With the holding
in Hall v. Kuiper, the right to new appropriations has been significantly limited. See note 125 supra.
126
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development give rise to "beneficial" uses of water, and in
allocating the water, awards the first claimant. Thereafter
the free market may cause a shift in uses, but the law is not
concerned with the merit or demerit of the choice the market
makes.
The Colorado Supreme Court has declared that the term
"beneficial use" is not a term defined by the constitution: "What
is beneficial use, afer all, is a question of fact and depends upon
the circumstances in each case.' 1 29 This reluctance to infuse an
absolute meaning or definition to a constitutional term may
offer some promise for the state in controlling water uses. If
the legislature were to define beneficial uses as those which
conform to a state water plan, there is a reasonable prospect
of upholding the statute.
The 1969 Act indicates a slight departure from prior law's
treatment of water adjudications as squabbles between competing private proprietary interests. While prior law expressly
limited the right to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce
evidence to water rights owners whose water rights were affected by the claim at hand, 3 0° the 1969 Act provides that "any
person" may file a statement of opposition to an application,"'
and the recitation of previous statutes which tied this right to
protest to persons who allege injury to their own vested water
rights is omitted. At trial of the claim, the 1969 Act also provides that "All persons interested shall be permitted to participate ....
,,132 The term person is defined by the 1969 Act
broadly:
"Person" means an individual, a partnership, a corporation, a
municipality, the state of Colorado, the United States of America,
or any other legal entity, public or private.133
Whether the 1969 Act was designed to expand the class of
parties who might contest water claims has not been determined by the Colorado Supreme Court. That question is confronting the referees and the water courts now in various proceedings. In at least one instance a trial court has ruled that
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(1939).
1'3 See Law of April 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 10, [1943] Colo. Sess. Laws 620,
repealed, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9 (Supp. 1969).
131 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
1:32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1971).
133CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(2) (Supp. 1969).
121*
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the 1969 Act did expand the class.134
If the 1969 Act does expand the class which may oppose
water claims, the ultimate issues to be determined by the water
court probably remain unchanged from prior laws. The 1969
Act is silent with regard to the grounds on which an opponent
might base his objection, and hence does not explicitly expand
the grounds of inquiry in disputed water claims. New claims
still turn on the claimant's proof of diversion and beneficial
use, in terms of priority of use. The 1969 Act does not authorize
denial of claims on the ground that the use of the water may
be inconsistent with state policy on growth or land use, or that
the claimant's use is less desirable in social terms than no use
at all, or that the use will wreak environmental damage. In the
case of changes of water rights, the sole issue specified by
statute is still a classic property dispute; namely, will the
change cause injury to the owner or person entitled to use other
135
vested water rights?
The 1969 Act also broke new ground by inserting the division engineer into all determinations of water rights proceedings.
In the case of applications heard by a referee, the referee must
consult with the division engineer and file in the cause a
report on the substance of the consultation. 13 6 In the case of
applications heard by the water judge (which, unlike hearings
before the referee, are conducted in the manner of a regular
trial) "the division engineer shall appear to furnish pertinent
1 37
information and may be examined by any party.'
What information is "pertinent" is not defined in the 1969
Act. The conclusion is that the division engineer's testimony is
probably limited by existing law to issues of less concern to the
state than to rival appropriators. For example, a division engineer could support or contradict facts alleged in the cause, of
which he had knowledge, and could probably offer expert testimony in certain kinds of cases. In changes in water rights, his
records may support testimony as to historic amounts of water
available for transfer by the water right in question, and he
might be qualified to offer expert testimony on whether an
134 Correspondence with Michael D. White, Esq., Master-Referee for the
135

136
137

Water Court for Divisions 4, 5 and 6, in United States water claims case
pending in the District Court for Garfield County.
A transfer could also be resisted on the grounds that a proposed use is
not a beneficial use. Thus, a transfer for purposes the law does not
recognize is assailable.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(4) (Supp. 1971), amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(4) (Supp. 1969).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. S 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1971).
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exchange proposal or a plan of augmentation would injuriously
affect other vested rights to water. But in none of these proceedings does the division engineer advance any proprietary
interest of the State of Colorado in the use or disposition of
public waters. His opinion on the claim as a wise and judicious
use is relevant only in the context of traditional notions of
waste or actual beneficial use, and his role seems to be that of
an aide to the court in determining the truth of the matters
asserted.
Under present law there is a very good possibility that the
attorney-general could make an appearance on behalf of the
State of Colorado, and participate in water determination hearings. If he were directed to do so by statute, the likelihood of
overcoming challenges to "standing" would be greater, for any
challenge would then be directed to the constitutionality of the
statute. It appears the state's property right and the police
power are sources of constitutional power on which to base this
138
state activity.
However, unless the scope of inquiry in water matters is
much enlarged so as to put before the court the basic issues
occasioning state interest, there is only a limited gain to be had
from state participation. The limited gain is that by policing all
claims, the state would keep claimants honest. No doubt there
is a need for some entity to shoulder this burden, for the
adversary system we have now depends upon an opponent with
financial wherewithal, but this approach does not deal directly
with the desirability in social terms of future water uses.
The state could choose to appear and attempt to assert in
pending applications for new water rights or in change cases
that a proposed use is nonbeneficial because of the adverse
impact the new use or transfer would have on public interests.
A court would be more likely to depart from traditional
notions of beneficial use and give consideration to this state
assertion if there were a statutory expression that the scope of
inquiry was to be widened.
III.

OBSERVATIONS

A. Impetus to Consumptive Water Uses
The doctrine of prior appropriation as we know it in Colorado contemplates the full use and consumption of all the water
in the state. The usages that are favored are traditional applica13-sSee West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476
(1947).
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tions of water in furtherance of economic development: more
industry; more farming; more human consumption. Full consumptive use of all Colorado waters may serve goals of economic development at the expense of what are referred to as
noneconomic values, that is, scenic, aesthetic, and environmental values.
There are external pressures promoting full usage of water,
especially with regard to the Colorado River. The assumption is
widespread that failure to make immediate full use of Colorado's share of Colorado River water will constitute a waiver of
the right to increase consumptive uses in Colorado at a future
date. This argument deserves thorough investigation and
13 9
analysis.
B.

Recognition of Social and Environmental Water Values

The present Colorado water law does not afford protection
for non-economic values. By virtue of express constitutional
provision all water is available for appropriation by diversion
to beneficial uses. The Colorado Supreme Court has refused
to permit an "appropriation" for an in-stream fishery on the
grounds that it did not involve a diversion. 140 This decision
probably bars any "appropriation" to protect in-stream, noneconomic values.
The water law should be flexible enough to accommodate
the noneconomic values which the public may hold. The Review
Draft of the National Water Commission recommends five legislative actions by states such as Colorado:
(1) reserving portions of streams from development and setting them aside as "wild rivers;"
(2)
authorizing a public agency to file for and acquire rights
in unappropriated water;
(3) setting minimum stream flows and lake levels;

(4)

establishing environmental criteria for the granting of

permits to use water;
(5) forbidding the alteration of watercourses without State
consent.141

Accommodation of these five goals in Colorado is difficult
under our constitution and decided cases. The first point,
reservation of waters from development, runs directly counter
139 The experience of the San Luis Valley would indicate that some established economies are displaced by compact obligations. Texas and New
Mexico appear to have successfuly held Colorado to that amount of
water awarded in the Rio Grande compact.
140 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
158 Colo. 331, 335, 406 P.2d 298, 300 (1965).
141 NWC 7-4.
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to the language of article XVI, section 6, that the right to divert
unappropriated waters shall never be denied.
The second point is the technique that was attemped and
failed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co.1 42 The Conservation District, pursuant to
statutory authorization, sought to make an appropriation for instream values. The supreme court said that there could be no
appropriation without actual diversion from the stream. Presumably the court did not mean to strike down impoundments
of in-stream reservoirs. Whether the proposed use qualified
as a "beneficial use" is unclear in the decision. This case does
present a formidable obstacle to a statutory accommodation of
"noneconomic" in-stream values. It is possible, of course, that,
confronted with a statute defining diversions to permit instream flows, and defining beneficial uses to include in-stream
fisheries or other environmental considerations, the court would
reverse or distinguish away prior case law. This is a matter of
conjecture. A surer remedy is a constitutional amendment. The
utility of such a statute or amendment, in a practical sense,
will depend on the availability of "unappropriated" waters in
fact.
The third point, establishing minimum stream flows, also
appears to run contrary to the constitutional right to divert
unappropriated waters. If that proviso cannot be circumvented
by making an appropriation for in-stream values, then it would
seem that a constitutional amendment is indeed necessary.
The fourth point, establishing environmental criteria in
awarding a water right, would seem to hold favorable possibilities. All water is subject to appropriation for beneficial use.
The supreme court has held that "beneficial use" is not defined
in the constitution, and is a question of fact. 143 A statutory
definition of beneficial use which required consideration of environmental impact before according the diversion the status of
a beneficial use might well withstand the inevitable legal
assault.
The fifth point, forbidding alteration of watercourses, was
once law in Colorado. The previous statute was not even honored in its breach, and was replaced in 1969.144 Presumably this
158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(1939).
144
No person owning or controlling any reservoir, lake or body
of water into which public waters flow and which furnishes
the water supply in whole cr in part to any stream containing
142
143

fish, shall divert or lessen such water inflow or supply to an
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statute could not halt water diversions pursuant
constitution.
C. Prospects for State Impact on Future Water Uses
1. An overview
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The State of Colorado is not, under present law, charged
with advancing or protecting the public interest in the applications for water rights or for changes of water rights. Under
existing law, litigants in water matters advance private proprietary interests. If the General Assembly were by statute
to assert that water rights should not be granted or changed
unless the result was consistent with the public interest, and
charge an appropriate state agency with advancing or protecting
that interest in water proceedings, challenges to its constitutionality would undoubtedly be made.
Conceivably, the state might now choose to designate an
agency with legal staff to participate in all water determinations to assure that all water rights applications do in fact meet
existing legal criteria. The 1969 Act permits "any person" to
file protests to claims, and permits "any person interested" to
participate in a hearing before the water court. 145 The "interest" requisite for Colorado participation could be said to arise
from its proprietary interest in public waters. There is a good
chance that the courts would afford the state "standing" under
existing law.
The utility of this approach is limited, although the state
would be a litigant, for the fundamental questions giving rise
to the state participation would continue to be beyond the scope
of the water court's inquiry. For example, it is of no moment
under present water law whether the award of a water right or
a change of a water right is consistent with a state water plan
or a state land use plan. Likewise, the water court is not concerned with the social and environmental impact of a claim for
a water right or a change of a water right. Further, the fact
that the proposed uses by rival applicants for the same water
have varying degrees of benefit to the state at large is
irrelevant.

45

1

extent detrimental to the fish in such stream, reservoir, lake
or body of water.
Law of April 27, 1899, ch. 98, § 13, [1899] Colo. Sess. Laws 198. This
statute was codified as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-16 (1963). In
1969, however, Chapter 62 was repealed and re-enacted, and this section
was entirely deleted. Law of July 1, 1969, ch. 157, § 1, [1969] Colo. Sess.
Laws 430.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1), 148-21-20(2), 148-21-20(3)
(Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1)(b),
148-21-20(2), (3) (Supp. 1971).
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The constitution, as interpreted to date, does not allow
direct choices to be made between competing applicants on the
basis of merit; it awards new rights on a first-in-time basis. In
the case of changes in water rights, Colorado law denies changes
only if other appropriators are injured. This right to a change
is an aspect of the constitutionally protected property right.
An attempt to insert into determinations of new water
rights state concern over the kinds of questions (now ignored)
discussed above would face intense political and legal challenges. The probable legal arguments against such a course of
action would be:
a. That it would violate the constitutional
vision guaranteeing the right to divert waters.

pro-

b. To the extent that it favored a junior claimant
to the right over a senior claimant on the ground that
his use was of greater benefit to society, it would violate the constitutional provision that "priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose."
It is settled law that this proviso means priority of appropriation gives the better right as between all users, with certain
"preferred" users having the right to satisfy their needs by condemnation of nonpreferred rights. Accordingly, there is little
point in attempting to allow the courts to choose between applicants on "merit."
In order to overcome the legal arguments of unconstitutionality, one would have to envisage a Colorado Supreme Court
willing to forsake a generally accepted interpretation of article
XVI, sections 5 and 6 and to reassert the public's concern with
disposition of its waters. Courts do depart from yesterday's
standard interpretations; whether they would do so here is conjectural. To sustain before the supreme court departures from
generally accepted tenets of the law of prior appropriation is
a substantial burden indeed, but perhaps there has never been
so favorable a climate in which to raise these questions. As a
matter of logic, there is no compelling reason to conclude that
the State Legislature is powerless to define "beneficial uses,"
"appropriations," and "diversions" in new appropriations to
accord with the felt necessities of today.
The assertion of a state interest in changes of water rights
would also face legal and political challenges similar to those
outlined above. Additionally, it will be argued that to restrict
changes in furtherance of a state interest would represent an
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unwarranted and unneeded state interference in the affairs of
the citizenry and in the optimum working of a free market economy. This is not a legal argument. The inclination of the state
to play a larger role in the ordering of our society is pronounced, and the decision is properly a political one to be made
by the people and their elected representatives. Also, it would
probably be argued that to restrict changes in water rights to
conform with a state interest in land and water use would constitute a "taking" for which compensation must be paid.
There is a good chance to uphold a statute whereby a
change in water right might be made to depend upon a finding
by the water court or other authority that the change was in
accord with a state policy on land and water use. The success
of this approach would probably depend in great measure upon
the specificity with which the state interest was spelled out.
In a sense this argument turns on the proposition that a use is
not beneficial when it contravenes enunciated state policy. This
conclusion is based on the fact that changes in water rights
are now said by the court to be an "inherent" property right.
The "inherent" right to change the use of other kinds of
property (e.g., land) has been limited by exercise of the police
power.
Other jurisdictions seem to control development, growth,
and density through more traditional land controls. One obvious merit of the traditional land approach is its lack of novelty.
However, as a conceptual matter, imposing state controls on
water transfers seems no more revolutionary than land controls
were 50 years ago. (It should be noted that land controls have
not always enjoyed immediate acceptance from the courts.)
2.

Conditional Decrees

The claims for water rights that have recently generated
substantial public controversy are conditionally decreed water
rights, or claims for conditional decrees now pending in proceedings before the water courts. Many people feel that perfection of all claims and conditional decrees will truly cause all
Colorado waters to be fully appropriated. The projects for
many conditionally decreed rights will probably never be built,
and hence some "unappropriated" waters will be available for
other uses. The entities with economic power sufficient to build
the projects are municipalities. Reclamation projects for agriculture do not have a healthy appearance.
Conditionally decreed water rights have been called "in-
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choate" interests by the courts, 146 but they are nevertheless property rights. If the owner fails to proceed with reasonable diligence to perfect the conditional right, it can be cancelled by the
court and the holder suffers a loss of his priority. 147 What constitutes reasonable diligence in a particular case is a question of
fact - a question that has given rise to a large body of litigation.1 48 There is no precise period in which a conditionally
decreed project must be completed; the courts have repeatedly
acknowledged that the time required may vary according to the
magnitude of the project, the economic resources of the appli14
cant and the economic conditions prevailing in the society. ' If
an applicant is making a bona fide attempt to complete his
project there is little likelihood that the conditional decree will
be cancelled.
Because of the ease with which conditional decrees may be
kept alive for many years, it has occasionally been suggested
that some fixed period of years be established in which a conditional decree be perfected or suffer cancellation. In 1969 the
general assembly was urged to place a 5-year (prospective)
limit on completion of all conditional decrees; failure to meet
the limit was to cause cancellation of the priority. This proposal
is widely unpopular with major water developers. The Board of
Water Commissoners of the City and County of Denver does not
wish to be forced immediately to construct projects, which, in
any reasonable planning scheme, will not be needed until 1990.
Quasi-municipal districts, such as the Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District and perhaps also the Colorado River
Water Conservation District'"0 hold conditional decrees for water
rights which will not be perfected to absolute decrees until Congress appropriates sufficient funds to construct the projects.
The struggle to authorize these projects and the investments
made to date in reliance on various conditional decrees are, in
146
147
148

149

150

Conley v. Dyer, 43 Colo. 22, 28, 95 P. 304, 306 (1908).
COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17(5) (Supp. 1969).
Cclorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970); City & County of Denver
v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992
(1954).
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970).
The Colorado River Water Conservation District may not object to a
fixed time period. Its major projects for which it holds conditional
decrees are also the subject of claims by the United States in pending
proceedings. The United States is seeking a better priority date than
the district obtained, and the United States asserts that federal rights
are not subject to loss for failure to show diligence in perfecting the
appropriation. Thus, if a federal right is obtained, the district's in-terests are placed beyond attack by rival Colorado appropriators.
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some cases at least, very substantial. The question then arises
whether, with such examples in mind, it would be constitutional
for the State of Colorado to impose a fixed time period for
completion of all conditional decrees.
It is believed that the state has the power to establish a
time period in which any new conditional decree, applied for
after enactment of the statute, must be completed in order for
the claimant to relate his priority date back to the time he
launched his claim. The doctrine of "relation back" is nowhere
embodied in the Colorado constitution; it is a judicial and legislative creation that is designed, according to our courts, to
allow large undertakings to proceed with secure knowledge
that the owners' priority position will be protected if they
complete their projects. The doctrine of relation back has been
held to be "in derogation of the Colorado constitution" and
hence to be strictly construed. Accordingly as to new claims
(not now decreed or applied for) the Legislature can, if it
chooses, either abolish the doctrine or limit it severely by
imposition of a fixed time limit for showing diligence.
Altering the test of reasonable diligence with regard to conditional decrees heretofore granted or now applied for in pending proceedings poses more difficult problems. Take the hypothetical case of a conditional decree previously entered, pursuant to which the owner has invested capital and is proceeding
with what the law now regards as due diligence even though
it may take 15 years to complete the project. A statute which
caused the loss of his priority unless he completed the project
in 5 years would undoubtedly be challenged by that claimant
as a taking, without compensation, of his property right. The
courts probably would be sympathetic to such a claim.
In order to sustain such a statute, it would have to be
shown that the regulation was reasonable and not abitrary. To
make no provision for extensions of time in cases where a fixed
period would work obvious inequities would invite an overturning of the statute.
Cases in which a claim for a conditional decree is pending
pose problems as well. Presumably in such cases, a claimant
has invested sufficient funds and energy to entitle him to a
conditional decree. If the project is large, for which a completion plan reasonably contemplates an extended period of
time, an imposition of a shorter, fixed period of time in which
the claimant cannot reasonably be expected to complete the
project, has the appearance of confiscatory legislation and hence
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also a taking for which compensation would be required.
Both conditionally decreed water rights and claims for
conditional water rights are property rights under Colorado law.
Their value may be less than perfected rights but they are nonetheless property. In Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. White River
1
' the supreme court held that a mere
Electric Association5
claimant to a conditional water right had a "vested right"
entitling him to contest a perfected water right owner's petition
for a change in point of diversion:
[O]ne who is entitled to a conditional decree defining his rights to
water for future application to use has a vested right which he
may protect in case of any action by others to destroy or injure
52
that right.'

This recognition of a property right in a claimant to a
conditional decree would logically extend to a holding that an
'unreasonable" or "arbitrary" destruction of that property right
by the state might constitute a taking. Determination of what
is "arbitrary" is obviously at the root of the problem.
In the case cited, Rocky Mountain Power Co. alleged expenditure of approximately $700,000 in furtherance of its claim.
Rendering such a project impossible of completion by imposition of a short fuse would be to invite the court to strike such a
statute down. No doubt there are steps that can be taken to
cause courts to impose a firmer standard with respect to diligence; however, an uncompromising legislative attempt to void
existing claims and conditional decrees seems unpromising.
Changes in water rights will have an increasing impact on
water use for there is a discernible trend for senior agricultural
rights to be converted into domestic or municipal rights.
Changes of water rights are complex and expensive, and are not
permitted when the proposed change will injure other appropriators. The expense and complexity of changes are presently a
deterrent to conversions, but with market forces demanding
water for development purposes, the costs of transfers are borne
more readily.
Transmountain diversions for agricultural purposes are the
obvious targets for such changes. It is easier to obtain a change
in water rights for foreign water than native water. Other
appropriators cannot frustrate changes of foreign water with
1 3
the ease that is possible in changes of native water.
151 151 Colo. 45, 52, 376 P.2d 158, 162 (1962).
152 Id. at 53, 376 P.2d at 162.
'53 A principal private perfected agricultural transmountain right, Twin
Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company's Independence Pass transmoun-
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3.

Some limitations on state activity
There are necessarily flaws of omission in attempting to
condition changes and new appropriations in conformance with
new state standards. First, the new standards would not deal
with existing applications for conditional decrees or existing
conditional decrees unless at some later date the owners sought
a change in water right - a very unlikely event in the case of
any right now held for municipal purposes.
Second, it is questionable whether federally funded reclamation projects could be affected by state regulation in reallocations of water rights within project lands. In at least one
project, Congress has determined that municipal applicants be
preferred in use of project water. The extent to which state
law can displace the applicable federal law is questionable.
Third, the preference system in the constitution appears to
grant a constitutional right to acquire water for domestic purposes by condemnation. This grant is not limited to any class
of domestic user. It would appear that even individuals possess
it. If, for example, the state water and land use plans called
for preservation of a certain area as green belt, and the state
plan was a valid consideration in a transfer proceeding, denial
of the change sought by a municipality on the ground that the
change would destroy the green belt would appear to frustrate
the preference system.
If the preference is an absolute constitutional right to
acquire water for a domestic use, then perhaps it deserves
repeal. Its rigidity seems undesirable. The general assembly
certainly has the authority to confer eminent domain powers on
54
preferred users without this constitutional provision.1
Perhaps an argument can be made that the preference as
well as (prospectively) the right to divert, could be confined
by statute to natural persons. The legal merits of such an assertion have not been investigated. It would obviously engender
concerted political opposition from municipalities and other
corporate appropriators.
D.

Transmountain Diversions and United States Claims for
Water Rights
Transmountain diversions are the practical victim of main-

tain diversion, has already been sold, in part, for conversion to municipal
uses.
154 The statutes and the home rule amendment already award this power.
See COLO. CONST. art. XX; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-32-1(78),
89-5-13(10) (1963).
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tenance of scenic rivers and minimum stream flows, for economic and engineering efficiency call for location of the facility
at high altitudes. If the need for water is great enough, presumably stream flows can be maintained and water pumped
back to the high altitude for transmountain diversions. There
has been some indication that the Denver Water Board is examining this alternative. Notions of economic limitations on what
a major municipality will pay for water may be out of date.
This solution does not satisfy those in the basin of origin whose
possibilities for future economic development are thereby
limited.
The failure of various western states to accommodate social
and environmental values in water is one of the justifications
offered by federal officials for the United States' claims to
reserved water rights.
The United States is now seeking water rights decrees for
itself in two sets of Colorado proceedings. The first is a state
water court suit and is a consolidation of claims made in divisions 4, 5, and 6 (roughly, the Gunnison, Colorado, White,
Yampa, and North Platte watersheds) as well as several statutory proceedings under pre-1969 Act law. The second is a quiet
title proceeding in federal court which the United States has
instituted with respect to waters in Water Division 7 (which
includes various regions in southwestern Colorado). (This second
case has been dismissed on the "abstention theory"; the state
courts are more qualified to decide the issue and thus the federal court will abstain.)
The United States' claims (excluding Indian claims) rest on
the theory that when certain public lands were withdrawn
from public entry and reserved to the United States, the United
States also reserved water rights necessary to effect the purposes of the reservation. The United States also claims that
certain federal water rights were created where the United
States Congress passed laws for the construction of reclamation
facilities. Further, the United States claims, with respect to its
"reserved" water rights on the national forests, that it is entitled to maintain stream flows at a level adequate to support
acquatic life and to protect aesthetic or environmental values.
The Indian water claims present unique considerations, and
are not treated here.
The claims of the United States have generated considerable
opposition from many Colorado appropriators, for the United
States seeks a priority date that is senior to a great number of
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previously adjudicated Colorado decrees. The rule of Colorado
law is that priorities are ranked according to date of adjudication. The United States, however, seeks to obtain its "true"
priority date, regardless of this Colorado rule. Some of the
major Western Slope water interests see the United States claim
as a device to limit transmountain diversions. By and large,
the United States claims antedate the transmountain diversions;
hence, to the extent the United States calls for water to satisfy
its needs, the diversion facilities along the Continental Divide
will bear the brunt of the demand. The United States also specifically claims the right to maintain a minimum stream flow
in streams located on the national forests. Transmountain diverters, who, in some cases, take the entire flow of a given stream,
regard this claim as a substantial threat to their historic water
yield. The United States' claims for decrees for reclamation
facilities on the Western Slope may obtain a more senior priority
date for those projects and provide insulation from abandonment for failure to construct the projects. The United States
seeks an earlier date for projects already decreed to its local
contracting agencies, and it also claims that the United States
is not subject to abandonment for nonuse of a water right.
The extent to which existing transmountain diversions
would be limited by entry of a decree in favor of the United
States is not known at this time. With regard to stream flow,
the United States has not yet disclosed what amount of water
it demands for each stream on the national forest. Also, the zeal
with which the Forest Service will assert any newly decreed
stream flow is unknowable at this time. Some transmountain
projects already provide for release of waters on the Western
Slope to sustain stream life. Whether the United States' claims
would affect those projects is also unknown.
The legal issues involved in the United States' claims for
Colorado waters present considerations which may reach the
United States Supreme Court. The Review Draft of the National
Water Commission, apparently conceding the United States'
legal position, proposes a number of legislative solutions to
problems arising from the federal claims for reserved rights,
including the recommendation that if the United States divests
prior appropriators under state law, then the United States
should pay compensation. Whether any such legislative relief
will be forthcoming is uncertain. Federal officials generally
regard compensation for water rights perfected under state law
as a giveaway.
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The United States claims for stream flows are not limited
to forest lands, but also include BLM lands located below the
national forests. If the United States obtains decrees for its
claims and calls for water to satisfy the decrees, some of the
environmental objectives 5 5 asserted in the National Water Commission Review Draft will be served. The end served may be
commendable, but the means, at least in the view of the National Water Commission, seem questionable, for it involves
divesting property rights heretofore enjoyed.
IV.

A.

WHAT EFFECT CAN THE STATE HAVE ON FUTURE WATER USES?

Can the State Constitutionally Affect the Present Place or
Nature of Use of Existing Water Rights?

In considering ways in which the state might have some
impact on future use of waters, a fundamental question is the
effect the state can have on the present place or nature of use
of existing water rights without violating the state constitution.
The Colorado constitution presents the general prohibition of a
taking or damaging of private property without just compensation' , and the specific protection of water rights under the
157
system of prior appropriation.
The system of prior appropriation is enshrined in concrete
in sections 5 and 6, article XVI, of the Colorado constitution.
In addition, the case law in Colorado is emphatic in its treatment of water rights as property rights which are entitled to the
constitutional protection of property. The sanctity of the property right in water has become a paramount principle in Colorado water law, as evidenced by the legal treatment of changes
in water rights, where the rule is firmly established that a
change in the exercise of a water right will be permitted unless
it adversely affects the vested water rights of any other
appropriators.
The one conceded general area of state authority over
property rights in water is authority to halt or limit wasteful
uses of water. 158 For example, an appropriator may be limited
from wasting water by excessive irrigation practices. 159 The
155 NWC 7-115 to -116.
15 6
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15, should be considered along with the prohibition against taking of private property embodied in the fifth amendment and made applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution.
157 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
158 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35 (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(7) (Supp. 1971). The general proposition
is that an appropriator is not entitled to waste water.
159'See City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552
(1961); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905).
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consequences of a firmer regulation of use of water are to make
more water available to junior appropriators, and, if the juniors
are satisfied, to make waters available for new appropriations.
Waste of water is not strictly policed in Colorado. Decrees
previously entered have often awarded quantities of water for a
particular use that are excessive for actual needs. The curtailment of excessive diversions is, however, a thorny political
problem. Frequently cited examples of alleged "excessive"
diversions are those made by certain senior decree holders on
the Western Slope, who to some degree attempt to assure that
transmountain diversions will not benefit by any failure to
utilize old Western Slope decrees to the fullest. No doubt these
irrigators think Denverites waste water on lawns.
To propose any action involving state interference with the
present mode of exercise of existing water rights, other than
regulation of wasteful uses, is to directly confront the time
honored concepts of the "sacred" or "inviolable" nature of
property rights. A strong argument can be made that affecting
the present place or nature of use of existing water rights would
also be an impermissible denial of the "right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses,"
as guaranteed by the constitution. The argument is that the
right to divert unappropriated waters includes the right to continue diverting, once an appropriation is made. This is really a
variant of the "sacred" property right theory. To impose regulation on an existing use, and thereby force cessation or change
of such use, would be such an interference as to amount to a
denial of that water right. The constitutional right to divert
means more than just protecting an initial diversion, but
properly interpreted, this proviso does not prohibit otherwise
constitutional regulation of property rights in water.
The primary constraint on state action remains the property
right in water. Any system attempting to affect the present
uses of water rights must withstand allegations that it amounts
to an unconstitutional taking or damaging of property without
compensation, based on federal and state consitutional provisions.160 There is no doubt that state regulation and especially
unreasonable state regulation or limitation of those water rights
can amount to a "taking" or "damaging" of property. To affect
an existing water right in such a way that no reasonable use
for it remains would amount to an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation.
160 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV;

COLO. CONST. art.

II, § 15.
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One approach to achieving control over uses of existing
water rights would be to treat existing uses in the way that
nonconforming uses are treated in zoning law. In this way, undesirable existing uses might be phased out over a period of
time without the necessity of payment of compensation arising.
Although the law is not uniform in all the states, there is a
growing tendency in zoning law to approve mandatory phaseouts of nonconforming uses after a reasonable period of time.
Uses of property existing at the time of the enactment of a
zoning law may therefore be required to be changed, after
a reasonable period of time in which to permit the owner to
amortize his investment. In some jurisdictions it is held that
as long as the zoning plan is reasonably related to the public
interest and the phase-out period is of reasonable duration,
the nonconforming user has no recourse and must change his
use without compensation. It appears that Colorado is tending
toward acceptance of this majority view. 161
One can argue that if the property right in land may be so
affected by zoning ordinances, the property right in water
should be susceptible to similar control under state law. Thus,
the holder of a water right who is putting such right to a use
contrary to that deemed to be in the best interests of the state
might be given a certain period of years in which to cease such
use or convert to another use. As in zoning of land, that period
would give him sufficient time to amortize his investment in the
water right. If the zoning analogy will hold, one might argue
that such a phasing-out program would not conflict with the
constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking or damaging
of property.
There are, however, peculiar features of the property right
in water that lead to the conclusion that the zoning of land
analogy is not likely to carry over to phasing-out of water uses.
First, the ability of a nonconforming water user to find other
reasonable use for his property right is very limited by the
principle that no change can be allowed which would injuriously affect the rights of others. Under this principle, it is
quite possible that a water user curtailed by the state could
not obtain a change since any change would injure other private
rights. This kind of dilemma would lead courts to treat manda161 See Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 000 F. Supp. 000 (D.
Colo. 1973) where the federal district court held Denver's sign code
amortization scheme unconstitutional. That opinion indicates that the
amortization schedule must be related to economic realities and cannot
be so arbitrary as to amount to a taking without just compensation.
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tory phase-outs as a "taking." Further, requiring a change in
use might well be held to be a taking without compensation
even if such other uses were reasonable uses for the reason that
changes in use require legal proceedings and substantial
expense.
Second, imposition of a phase-out on nonconforming uses
may infringe the specific water law provisions of the Colorado
constitution. One can argue that the right to divert should be
on the same level as the right to hold property in general
and therefore susceptible to phasing-out requirements; however,
by virtue of the provision guaranteeing the right to divert,
water rights may have a special insulated status.
More troublesome are the preference provisions of the Colorado constitution. In light of the preferences, it may be beyond
the state's power to divest a preferred domestic user. For example, a state attempt to force a change in use from domestic
to agricultural would appear inconsistent with the constitutional
preference. (The same problems with respect to the constitutional preferences would arise in attempts to limit changes in
present uses from less favored uses to domestic uses.)
The conclusions are that, except for curtailing waste and
nonbeneficial uses, there is little practical prospect for affecting
the present place or nature of use of existing water rights without the payment of compensation; that phasing out nonconforming uses in water is not a promising approach; and that
the preference system poses a possible obstacle even to condemnation. In view of the constitutional and practical problems
that are presented, if an effort to affect existing uses is contemplated, it should be a supplementary and severable portion
of any overall water use legislation. The effect of the preference for domestic uses as a restraint of the state's ability to
acquire water rights by condemnation is not susceptible of a
firm answer. Questions of "dominant" eminent domain whereby
overwhelming public necessity displaces an existing public
right 162 have not, in the reported cases, confronted a preference
system.
B.

Regulation of Changes in Water Rights

One possible approach to asserting state interest in future
water use patterns is to regulate changes from existing uses
162

Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(federal government has power to condemn property of a state or one
of its subdivisions); Welch v. City & County of Denver, 141 Colo. 587,
349 P.2d 352 (1960) (land held for a public use may be condemned for
another public use where such taking is required by public necessity).
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that are contrary to what are legislatively determined to be in
the best interests of the state. This system would avoid the
troublesome prospect of attempting to force changes in the existing use of water rights. Rather, it would seek to regulate those
changes in use that appropriators themselves propose to make.
This approach would not permit so comprehensive a program
of conforming water use in the state to desired patterns, but it
could have significant effect on future changes of existing water
use patterns. 63 It is not unlike the concept of zoning or planning land use, where the plan is generally structured around
the existing patterns of land use at the time the zoning law
is enacted, in conjunction with the desired future pattern of
land use. Starting with the existing pattern of water use, and
regulating the manner in which that pattern is changed in the
future, it would be possible for the state to guide the development of new water use patterns along lines that it determined
would be in the best interests of the people of the state.
The obstacle with respect to initiating a system of regulating changes in water rights according to a state plan is the
certainty of constitutional challenge. This question of constitutionality cannot be definitively answered, because the Colorado
Supreme Court has never been faced with the issue. An examination of specific Colorado constitutional provisions, as well as
the general nature of the "right" to change water rights, however, may bring the answer nearer.
As related elsewhere in this article, the right to make
changes in the exercise of water rights has traditionally been
recognized as an integral part of the water rights themselves.
Court decisions have spoken in terms of the right to change
being an inherent property right existing as an incident of the
water right itself. 16 4 Despite being cast in such sweeping terms
There probably are significant limits even to this approach. For example, decrees held by water conservancy districts such as Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District are for a multiplicity of uses
over the entire district with the district board claiming the right under
its decrees to allocate its water to these various uses on an annual
basis with no application to the courts for a change in use. The United
States is the owner of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project water as
trustee for reclamation beneficiaries. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District made permanent allocations of all its water to users
by 1955. Changes in uses of project water are not submitted to the
water court. The district takes the position that it has the authority to
approve such .changes. We have not had time to determine whether
users of project water could realistically be required to submit to state
proceedings. Perhaps the boards of these districts would be amenable
to make their change procedures conform to a state plan. However,
a conservancy district's duty, pursuant to the federal law by which
its project was constructed to make reallocations of water for municipal
purposes, probably would supersede any state laws.
164 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
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as an inviolable or "sacred' '165 property right, the right to make
changes in water rights has in fact been subject to strict limitation in Colorado. The basis for such limitation has been the
doctrine that no change may be made that would have an injurious effect on the vested water rights of any other appropriator. The vested rights of appropriators, no matter how junior
or senior, have always been afforded absolute protection against
any change in another water right that would cause them any
harm. The right to change is now subordinated to the right of
other appropriators to maintain the existing benefits of their
water rights as presently used, regardless of priority. In other
words, a prior appropriator really has a priority over other
appropriators only with respect to the present manner of use
of his water right. His water right does not necessarily carry
with it the right, as against other appropriators, to make
changes in the exercise of the water right, even if no greater
quantity of water is consumed thereby. 166 In this sense, despite
the sweeping language about property rights, the right to
change a water right does not have the same dignity as the
right to maintain and preserve a water right in its existing
form. The courts have totally forbidden a senior appropriator
from exercising his right to change if such exercise would have
any injurious effect which cannot be adequately mitigated by
imposing conditions on the change.
To date, the limitation on changes has been on the narrow
basis of the effect on other private rights. No reported case indicates that the change may be denied on the basis of its effect
on the public's property right in water. Any new program to
this end must be tested against several constitutional principles.
The first such consideration is the prohibition, in both the
Colorado and United States Constitutions, against taking property without just compensation. 16 The issue is whether state
regulation or curtailment of the right to make changes in water
rights constitutes a taking or damaging of property. The argument of a "taking" would be founded on the theory that the
right to make changes in the use of private property is a constitutionally protected right, and that any limitation of that
165

Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 71, 26 P. 313, 316

(1891).
166 See, e.g., Handy Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 515,
62 P. 847 (1900).
167 The federal prohibition of such takings is embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The applicable provision of the Colorado constitution is art. II, § 15, which states that "[pirivate property shall not
be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation."
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right constitutes a violation of the constitution. A variation of
that argument might be that while the right to make changes
is not expressly awarded in the constitution, it is an essential
part of the water right itself, and therefore is not susceptible to
limitation. These arguments are considerably weakened by the
fact that the right to make changes in water rights is not now
in fact an absolute property right.
It is possible to construct a system of regulation of changes
in water rights, reasonable and in accordance with clear legislative guidelines, which does not amount to an unconstitutional
taking or damaging of property. Setting aside for the moment
the sections of the Colorado constitution dealing specifically
with water rights, the analogy of regulating water rights to
clearly constitutional regulation of property uses arising from
zoning and land planning holds promise. Property rights in
land are subject to very significant limitations in use under
zoning laws, yet such laws, if they are a reasonable exercise of
168
the police power, are upheld against constitutional attack.
There is no necessary reason to exalt water rights above other
kinds of property rights. Water rights should logically be susceptible of the same type and degree of regulation as are
other property rights. Moreover, the right to change an existing water right should, if anything, be accorded less dignity
than the right to maintain existing use. Imposing restrictions
on what types of changes may be made in a water right still
leaves untouched the existing use of that water right, and in
this sense can be considered neither a taking nor a damaging.
It is commonplace for property rights in land to be limited in
this manner by zoning laws. As long as the regulatory scheme
is reasonable and not arbitrary, and as long as it permits continued use along present patterns, the regulation of changes in
use would appear to be no more unconstitutional, in terms of
being a taking or damaging of property without compensation,
than are the restrictions imposed by zoning laws. The courts
have developed a body of law with respect to zoning that illustrates how the constitutional problems are dealt with.
Returning to the doctrine of prior appropriation, as contained in article XVI, sections 5 and 6, it may be argued that
it necessarily carries with it the right to put water to whatever
use the owner sees fit whenever he sees fit. This argument
depends on an exaltation of the property right in water to a
unique, insulated and forever unassailable position. It is be168
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lieved that there are no property rights so utterly beyond state
control. Under a strictly literal interpretation of the constitutional language in sections 5 and 6, regulation of changes in
water rights would not appear to be unconstitutional. However,
the right to a change was not derived from those sections by
the supreme court; it was derived from the property right. 1 9
Regulation of changes in the use of water rights would therefore seem to be a permissible exercise of the police power of
the state, not in fatal conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation. One should note that special care would be necessary
in drafting a statute so that an unwitting taking did not occur.
Specific changes have heretofore been utterly denied when no
conditions would protect other rights; however, a state prohibition of the only available change might be another matter.
The third constitutional consideration is the preference
doctrine:
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service
of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those
claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the
same for manufacturing purposes. 170
The preference provision presents at least a theoretical obstacle
to a legislative system regulating changes in water rights. The
preference language may provide such large holes for preferred
users that the system could be rendered ultimately ineffectual.
The logical consequence of the preference provision is to
permit all water to be acquired for domestic purposes, regardless of any statutory regulation to the contrary. For example,
if, under a regulatory system, a water right used for agricultural
purposes were prevented, pursuant to an otherwise constitutional regulation, from being changed to domestic use, the
prospective domestic user could probably be expected to assert
a constitutional right, arising from the preference, to use that
water right for domestic purposes, and to seek to condemn
the right if necessary. If this invocation of the preference were
sustained against exercise of the state interest in defeating the
change in use, the regulatory system may then suffer from a
flaw of considerable proportions, namely an inability to constrain conversions of agricultural water rights to domestic pur169 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
170 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.

COLORADO WATER LAW PROBLEMS

poses in those cases where the change was unwanted in terms
of the state plan. In view of the probable goals of any water
use plan in Colorado at this time, the purpose of the plan might
be defeated by this application of the preference. A discussion
of systems to regulate changes in water rights should therefore
be considered in light of this contingent constitutional problem.
There are a number of approaches for asserting the state's
interest with respect to changes in water rights. The possibilities
range from completely overhauling the existing legal and constitutional framework and substituting an entirely new system
of state administrative regulation, at one extreme, to merely
attempting to increase the state's role in water proceedings
within the existing judicial system at the other.
A purely administrative system for all changes in water
rights might be desirable because of the degree of direct control it would afford the state over such changes. This type of
system, however, would be a major departure from the judicial
system of water rights determinations that has traditionally
existed and still exists in Colorado. If changes were to be
handled administratively, then perhaps other water matters
should be so treated.
It is possible, however, to construct a system for changes
of water rights utilizing an administrative authority to which
applications for changes in water rights are submitted as a
prerequisite to obtaining the traditional judicial decree for
such changes. The administrative authority would be charged
with evaluating applications in the light of the public interest,
as specifically defined by the legislature. The legislature would
have to promulgate comprehensive guidelines and standards
on which the administrative authority would base its determinations. For example, the proposed change might be required
to conform to a comprehensive state plan for water use and
growth. The administrative authority would have to be given
flexibility in changing the requirements where the public interest demanded it. It does not seem likely that the state would
wish to say that, as an absolute matter, this water shall forever be applied to irrigation of crops on a specific tract. The
legislature might spell out the types of situations in which the
public interest might demand different results. Once administrative approval were obtained, the change might then be processed judicially as under present law, and the factors presently
considered in such proceedings, such as injury to vested rights
of others, would be considered by the referee or judge. A
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decree permitting the change would then issue.
An administrative approval system coupled with a judicial
proceeding, while not a total abandonment of the present
system of water rights administration, would still be a significant departure from that system. The effect of such a system
could be as great as that of a completely administrative system,
in the sense that denial of administrative approval 7 1 would
prevent the proposed change. It is likely that opposition to
the dual type of system would be nearly as great as to a purely
administrative system.
Consideration might also be given to legislation that would
continue the water court's primary role in changes, so that the
ultimate decision to grant or deny a change in water rights
would remain a judicial question. Although the state would not
thereby gain direct, absolute control over changes in water
rights, legislation could charge the judge or referee to render
decisions in accordance with new standards of public interest
in addition to considerations of injury that have traditionally
controlled such proceedings. Something more than a broad
requirement that decisions be in accord with the public interest
would appear necessary. Legislative standards would have to be
both comprehensive and specific enough to give concrete guidance in deciding individual cases. 17 2 This specificity will also
prevent each judge's or referee's subjective concept of the
public interest from determining the future course of water
development in the state. This is easier said than done.
Regardless of the specificity of legislative standards, however, it is unrealistic and unfair in an adversary legal system
to expect that the judges and referees will consistently render
decisions in accordance with the "public interest" if the only
persons asserting positions in such proceedings are the proponents of change and other private parties seeking to serve
their own interests. If the ultimate determination of issues is
left to the water court, then consideration also ought to be
given to allowing a state agency to take an active role in
water rights proceedings, to present to the judge or referee
the state's position on the proposed change in light of the
public interest and legislative standards, and to urge the rendering of a decision that would best serve that interest.
The legislature could create a state agency or charge an
Presumably the decision of the administrative authority would be subject to judicial review just as other administrative determinations are.
It is common to limit the scope of that review.
172 See CLYDE, supra note 111, at 64-69.
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existing authority with the function of monitoring all water
proceedings wherein the legislative standards for water use in
the public interest or a comprehensive state water use plan
indicated that the proposed change should be denied.
As has been suggested elsewhere in this article, perhaps the
state can intervene in water proceedings, including changes,
even under present law, since the 1969 Act permits "any person"
to file protests to claims 173 and permits "all persons interested"
to participate in hearings before water judges. 17 4 Present law,
however, does not afford adequate basis in opposing changes
for state intervention to have a substantial effect on conforming changes to planning guidelines or to a state water plan or
land use plan. Alterations in the statutes to permit expanded
grounds for opposing changes would therefore be necessary.
The state agency need not intervene in every change proceeding. Rather, it could evaluate each pending change in light
of conformity to or effect on a state plan for water use development approved by the legislature. The agency, through an
adequate legal staff, could then enter its appearance in those
proceedings where proposed change would be inconsistent with
the legislative plan. The agency could participate in the proceeding before the referee or judge in the same manner as
other interested parties and be given full opportunity to present
its case opposing the change or urging limitation on the change.
A decision would then be rendered accordingly, which presumably would strike the proper balance between the state interest
and private rights.
Consideration might also be given to eliminating the potential dual proceedings, before referee and water judge, which
may occur under the present statute, at least with respect to
cases in which the state agency would participate. It would
seem better, in cases in which the new state agency was to
participate, to have just one proceeding that would determine
whether or not the change should be permitted (except for
appellate review).
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to suggest
the types of legislative standards or the nature of a water use
plan to be used in this program. The requisite legislative guidelines could take either the form of a comprehensive set of
73
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objective standards, to be applied in change proceedings to the
particular facts involved, or that of a comprehensive state
water use plan, delineating the future patterns of use desired
(and determined to be "beneficial") in the various regions of
the state. The substantive details of either manner of legislative declaration must be the result of major policy decisions,
integrated into a workable plan for implementaion. The important point, from a legal standpoint, is that the legislative
plan be comprehensive enough to permit assertion of the state's
interest in all cases of changes of water rights throughout the
state, yet flexible enough to meet the exigencies of individual
cases. Finally, the policies to be served must be clearly and
reasonably related to the welfare of the people of the state in
175
order to be a proper exercise of the police power.

175 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

